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ABSTRACT: There is a familiar saying, “If all you have is a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail.” The so-called Law of the Hammer takes a 
distinctive form in adjudication. If all judges see is one repeating fact pattern 
for a given area of law, they might perceive it as archetypical and build the 
law around it. If that fact pattern does not accurately reflect the field, however, 
the result can be analytical distortion in terms of both the choice of doctrine 
and its implementation. 
This Article uses Second Amendment jurisprudence to illustrate this 
phenomenon. It reveals how District of Columbia v. Heller constitutionalized 
a policy area far broader than most appreciate, one that involves not only 
guns but various other weapons. The Article then shows how litigation fails 
to reflect that breadth. Guns are just one category of “arms” that most 
Americans choose not to own or carry for self-defense, but guns alone saturate 
Second Amendment case law. Non-gun arms are out of view when judges 
establish and apply Second Amendment doctrine. The Article contends that 
this gun-centricity, by obscuring the ways Americans exercise post-Heller 
Second Amendment rights, has led judges to exaggerate burdens, misread 
history, and espouse short-sighted doctrine to implement the right to keep and 
bear arms. More generally, the Second Amendment case study in this Article 
exposes litigation circumstances that create a heightened risk of such distortion as 
well as possible solutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear knives, 
tasers, clubs, and many other instruments as well as, of course, guns.1 But what 
do judges see when deciding the typical Second Amendment case? On one 
side is a gun owner challenging a gun law. That gun owner is joined by gun 
rights groups holding themselves out as guardians of the Second Amendment. 
On the other is the government defending the gun law. The government is 
joined by groups seeking to prevent gun violence. The parties stake out 
opposed positions, but they have something in common: a single-minded 
focus on guns. And if judges look beyond the litigation to the public discourse, 
they see gun commentary and gun scholarship. The inputs are gun-centric, 
and this Article shows how the outputs can be, too. The Second Amendment 
risks becoming the Law of the Gun, when it should be the Law of Arms.2 
 
 1. The Second Amendment protects a right to keep and bear “arms,” not firearms. U.S. 
CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”); see also infra Section III.A 
(discussing meaning of “arms”). 
 2. The title of this Article is a play on the Law of the Hammer or the Law of the Instrument, 
which has been attributed to philosopher Abraham Kaplan: “I call it the law of the instrument, and 
it may be formulated as follows: Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he 
encounters needs pounding.” ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY FOR 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 28 (1st ed. 1964). This concept may have literal application for guns 
—someone with a gun can see threats necessitating gun use where none exist. See, e.g., Josh 
Solomon, Six Years After Movie Theater Shooting, Trial Set for Curtis Reeves, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 5, 
2020), https://www.tampabay.com/news/crime/2020/02/05/trial-date-is-set-in-infamous-movie-
theater-shooting [https://perma.cc/GM3N-LC3T] (describing fatal shooting over a dispute 
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The fact that single cases, and even collections of cases, are frequently 
unrepresentative of a given legal area has been acknowledged in legal 
scholarship.3 Some literature suggests that the unrepresentativeness of 
particular cases might always distort the creation or application of judicial 
doctrine.4 However, unrepresentative litigation need not correlate with 
problematic distortion. For example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg famously 
represented men to transform gender discrimination law, despite the fact that 
women were most often targets of such discrimination.5 But few would argue 
that the unrepresentativeness of those cases skewed doctrine in a way that 
somehow failed to account for discrimination against women.  
In this Article, I explore when, how, and why unrepresentative cases 
distort doctrine through a case study of emerging Second Amendment 
jurisprudence.6 I expose how Second Amendment litigation does not reflect 
the full scope of arms that receive constitutional protection. I then trace the 
doctrinal consequences of that unrepresentativeness, showing how it leads to 
flawed arguments to strike down gun laws.  
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court upended generations 
of jurisprudence when it declared that the “core” interest served by the 
Second Amendment is private self-defense, not militia service.7 Commentary 
has rightfully focused on the accuracy of that transformational holding.8 
 
about cell phone use in a movie theater). As I describe here and in Part II, the phenomenon I 
explore focuses on the context of judicial analysis. 
 3. I discuss this scholarship in Part II. Of the rich literature, I rely primarily on TIMOTHY 
ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2018); LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL 
LIBERTIES COMPROMISE (2016); Nancy Leong, Improving Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 377 (2014); 
Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405 (2012); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad 
Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006); and Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial 
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999). 
 4. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 3, at 894–95 (“[W]hen decisionmakers are in the thrall of 
a highly salient event, that event will so dominate their thinking that they will make aggregate 
decisions that are overdependent on the particular event and that overestimate the 
representativeness of that event within some larger array of events.”). 
 5. See JANE SHERRON DE HART, RUTH BADER GINSBURG: A LIFE 256–63 (2020) (discussing 
Ginsburg’s advocacy in Califano v. Goldberg); FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN 
LAW 65–66 (2009) (describing Ginsburg’s representation of Stephen Wiesenfeld). 
 6. Lisa L. Miller, The Use of Case Studies in Law and Social Science Research, 14 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 381, 386 (2018) (discussing how case studies in legal scholarship can provide a basis 
“to generate, refine, question, or challenge extant theoretical frames”). 
 7. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599, 630 (2008); see infra Section III.A. 
 8. One notable line of scholarship critiques the majority opinion’s historical analysis. See, 
e.g., Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 26, 2008), https://new 
republic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness [https://perma.cc/T6SW-JLJU] (characterizing Heller 
as “faux originalism,” a historical “snow job[]” and “freewheeling discretion strongly flavored with 
ideology”); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 
253, 274 (2009) (calling Heller a “new” form of judicial activism based in “originalism”); Reva B. 
Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 195–
201 (2008) (showing through historical analysis how the self-defense understanding of the 
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Overlooked, however, is another implication of the opinion: by shifting the 
focus from collective defense to self-defense, the Court greatly expanded the 
range of constitutionally protected “arms.” Indeed, Heller used words like 
“weapon,” “thing,” and “instrument” in explaining the meaning of “arm.”9 
The few courts and commentators to consider the issue agree that covered 
weapons after Heller extend beyond guns.10 In one opinion, for example, 
Justice Samuel Alito concluded that stun guns are protected by the Second 
Amendment given that they “are widely owned and accepted as a legitimate 
means of self-defense across the country.”11 Countless instruments could 
satisfy that metric. This Article is the first to categorize the range of weapons 
that arguably receive constitutional protection under Heller.12 
Yet, Second Amendment litigation is consumed by guns.13 This is true of 
high-profile cases as well as more mundane ones. Most scholarship and public 
commentary on the right to keep and bear arms likewise neglect to consider 
non-gun weapons.14 I probe possible reasons for the imbalance, such as the 
usefulness of guns for fighting a tyrannical government,15 the role of the gun 
 
Second Amendment in Heller grew out of twentieth-century law and order politics); Saul Cornell, 
The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1695–97 (2012) (exposing anachronism in Heller). 
 9. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581–82, 584, 592; infra Section III.A. 
 10. See infra notes 104–48 and accompanying text (describing this case law and commentary). 
 11. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 420 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 12. See infra Section III.A. Firearms, and handguns in particular, have been the overwhelming 
focus of legal scholarship on weapons for decades. See James B. Jacobs, The Regulation of Personal 
Chemical Weapons: Some Anomalies in American Weapons Law, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 141, 141 (1989) 
(“Socio-legal scholarship on weapons has been dominated by research and analysis devoted to 
firearms, especially handguns.”). A handful of articles have addressed Second Amendment 
coverage for non-gun weapons. See generally Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second 
Amendment, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 63 (2020) (exploring how self-defense law operates to steer 
conflicts away from lethal force such as defensive gun usage, and how that self-defense 
characteristic can inform the implementation of the Second Amendment); Eugene Volokh, 
Nonlethal Self-Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and the Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and 
Defend Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 199 (2009) (discussing electrical weapons and chemical sprays in 
relation to the Second Amendment); Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, Lethality, Public Carry, 
and Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279 (2016) (considering the potential Second 
Amendment significance of advancing non-lethal weapons technology); David B. Kopel, Clayton 
E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Knives and the Second Amendment, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 167 
(2013) (discussing the Second Amendment protection of knives). 
 13. See generally Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, at app. C xxiv–xxv (2018) (showing 
that in post-Heller litigation through January 2016 gun cases outnumbered nonlethal weapon 
cases roughly 50:1). 
 14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 15. According to one strand of thought, “the Second Amendment protects a citizen’s right 
to keep and bear arms to use should the militia be needed to fight against invaders, terrorists, 
and tyrants.” Miller v. Bonta, No. 19-cv-1537-BEN, 2021 WL 2284132, at *44 (S.D. Cal. June 4, 2021). 
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rights movement,16 the intensity with which gun owners value gun rights,17 
and whether there is a regulatory imbalance in which guns are more regulated 
than other weapons (and are thus better targets for litigation).18 I contend, 
however, that none of these factors negate the relevance of non-gun weapons 
when it comes to implementing the post-Heller Second Amendment.  
A more relevant factor after Heller is how Americans actually own and use 
arms for self-defense, which Heller pronounced to be the “core” interest 
protected by the Second Amendment.19 According to Heller, handguns are the 
“most popular weapon” for self-defense.20 If accurate, that popularity might 
justify gun-centricity in Second Amendment litigation and doctrine. 
But as this Article shows, existing data is in tension with Heller’s 
assumption about handguns.21 Only a small proportion of self-defense actions 
involve guns, only a small proportion of arms are guns, and only a tiny 
proportion of guns are ever used for lawful self-defense. By some measures, 
fewer than a quarter of eligible Americans own a gun, a much smaller 
percentage than those who choose not to have a gun but possess knives, clubs, 
stun guns, chemical sprays, or other instruments that can serve as self-defense 
 
 16. The efforts of the gun rights movement to mold public sentiment in the runup to Heller 
is well documented. See, e.g., MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION: OUR DEADLY 
DEVOTION TO GUNS AND FREE SPEECH 61–75 (2019) (describing how the gun lobby has associated 
the Second Amendment with the individual right to use guns for self-defense); DAVID COLE, 
ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 97–148, 
99 (2016) (chronicling “the longstanding campaign of the National Rifle Association to establish 
and defend an individual right to bear arms”); MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A 
BIOGRAPHY 87–137 (2014) (exploring how the NRA’s entrance into the political scene 
recharacterized the public understanding of the Second Amendment); infra notes 83–93 and 
accompanying text (specifically discussing the strategies the NRA employed in the 1970s to shape 
the current public view that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to own a gun 
for self-defense). In addition, gun rights groups make no secret about their use of Second 
Amendment litigation to expand and protect gun rights. See infra notes 165–68 and 
accompanying text (describing work and mission of the National Rifle Association Civil Rights 
Defense Fund and other gun rights groups). 
 17. See generally DAN BAUM, GUN GUYS: A ROAD TRIP (2013) (describing the complex and 
diverse ways guns inform many gun owners’ identities). 
 18. The degree to which this is true is debatable. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 145 (observing 
similarities and differences between the regulation of chemical sprays and firearms, including 
jurisdictions in which chemical sprays are more strictly regulated); Volokh, supra note 12, at 209 
–16 (same for chemical sprays and electrical weapons). 
 19. As a practical matter, litigants in post-Heller cases overwhelmingly assert an interest in 
armed self-defense against criminals, not arms for hunting, target shooting, opposing tyranny, or 
some other end. See Ruben, supra note 12, at 64 n.2 (“[P]ost-Heller case law has focused on the 
Second Amendment interest in self-defense, which is almost always the interest asserted by 
litigants.”). 
 20. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008); infra notes 171–73 and 
accompanying text (discussing similar references about handgun popularity in Heller). 
 21. See infra Section III.B (discussing this data). 
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weapons.22 The disparity is especially pronounced when isolating weapons 
preferences by sex or political ideology.23 More women and liberals, for 
example, have reported a preference for carrying less lethal weapons than 
guns for self-protection.24 Modern-day empirics underscore the 
unrepresentativeness of today’s gun-centric litigation. 
That unrepresentativeness would not be problematic if the judicial 
analysis in gun cases were not distorted in problematic ways. As I show, 
however, unrepresentative litigation has led to at least two analytical problems 
that are relied upon by judges to declare gun laws unconstitutional.25 First, 
courts have exaggerated burdens imposed by gun laws.26 Judges, for example, 
have written that gun laws “eviscerate” or “destroy” the right to keep and bear 
arms regardless of how the law treats other weapons.27 On the basis of such 
exaggerations, judges have concluded that gun restrictions are per se 
violations of the Second Amendment. A holistic assessment of personal 
weaponry puts into stark relief the vast options available for self-defense and 
puts into perspective the relative place of gun regulation against that 
backdrop. It complicates facile claims used to pronounce gun laws 
unconstitutional, such as concluding that a gun restriction “criminaliz[es] 
exercise of the [Second Amendment] right entirely.”28  
Relatedly, beyond challenging exaggerated claims of Second Amendment 
burdens, the breadth of arms reinforces arguments for judges to expressly 
consider weapon alternatives when deciding at least some Second 
Amendment cases.29 The Article shows how doing so would provide solutions 
in confused areas of doctrine, such as explaining how ex-felons can be 
disqualified from the right to have a gun while maintaining the right to keep 
and bear arms.30  
Second, in addition to flawed assessments of Second Amendment 
burdens, gun-centricity obscures problems that will arise if judges adopt a 
purely historical test for deciding Second Amendment cases that is favored by 
 
 22. See infra notes 186, 192–99 and accompanying text (discussing survey data about 
modern weapons preferences). 
 23. See infra notes 200–06 and accompanying text.  
 24. See infra notes 201, 206 and accompanying text.  
 25. See infra Section III.C. 
 26. See infra Section III.C.1.  
 27. See, e.g., Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 946 (9th Cir. 2016) (Callahan, J., 
dissenting) (declaring that a licensing regime for carrying handguns “eviscerates the Second 
Amendment right of individuals to keep and bear arms”); Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 
1144, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (declaring that a 
licensing regime for carrying handguns “affect[s] a destruction of the right to bear arms”); infra 
notes 244–48 and accompanying text (providing other examples). 
 28. Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 358 (3d Cir. 2016) (Hardiman, J., concurring). 
 29. See infra notes 251–66 and accompanying text (discussing arguments for an adequate 
alternatives test in Second Amendment cases). 
 30. See infra notes 255–64 and accompanying text. 
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many gun rights advocates. That test, known as “text, history, and tradition” 
or “THT”31 may also appeal to several current Supreme Court Justices if it is a 
workable doctrinal option.32 But using THT to adjudicate non-gun cases 
presents a host of unappreciated difficulties. For example, there is no 
regulatory history for voltage limits on stun guns or concentration limits on 
chemical sprays. Indeed, not only is there no direct historical evidence to draw 
on for such weapons, but analogizing to the treatment of incomparable arms 
like guns incorporates arbitrary discretion, not objective certitude, into the 
judicial analysis.33  
Meanwhile, courts relying on historical precedent have overlooked a 
significant way challenged historical regulations are disanalogous to the gun 
policies challenged today.34 In particular, the focus of right-to-bear arms cases 
in the nineteenth-century was generally laws targeting a host of personal 
weapons in one fell swoop, whereas the focus in modern cases is on gun-
specific regulations.35 The modern-day, gun-centric judicial analysis has 
glossed over that distinction and some judges, in turn, have relied on flawed 
arguments based in historical analogy to strike down gun laws. 
The Second Amendment case study in this Article illustrates 
circumstances in which unrepresentative litigation risks leading to analytical 
warping.36 When, as in the Second Amendment context, a nascent area of law 
is accompanied by heavy interest group activity, the judicial environment is 
ripe for distortion. Judges are less likely to be presented with an accurate view 
of the range of policies and questions implicated by their decisions, and thus 
 
 31. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach 
Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 893–907 (2013) (discussing the text, history, and tradition 
approach). 
 32. The “text, history, and tradition” approach is often traced to a dissenting opinion by 
then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) [hereinafter Heller II] (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). It may also be embraced by other Justices 
who self-identify as originalists, including Amy Coney Barrett, Neil Gorsuch, and Clarence 
Thomas. 
 33. Then-Judge Kavanaugh suggested that when historical sources do not speak directly to 
a modern question, one must reason by analogy, identifying “principles” that are relevantly 
similar in the two time periods. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The 
constitutional principles do not change (absent amendment), but the relevant principles must 
be faithfully applied not only to circumstances as they existed in 1787, 1791, and 1868, for 
example, but also to modern situations that were unknown to the Constitution’s Framers.”). 
 34. See infra Section III.C.2. 
 35. See, e.g., JOHN P. DUVAL, ESQ., COMPILATION OF THE PUBLIC ACTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA 423 (1839) (1835 law) (“[I]t shall not be lawful for any 
person in this Territory to carry arms of any kind whatsoever secretly, on or about their persons 
. . . .”); 1839 Ala. Laws 67, An Act to Suppress the Evil Practice of Carrying Weapons Secretly, § 1 
(“That if any person shall carry concealed about his person, any species of fire arms, or any bowie 
knife, Arkansaw tooth-pick, or any other knife of the like kind, dirk, or any other deadly weapon, 
the person so offending, shall [be punished as prescribed].”); infra notes 299–313 and 
accompanying text (providing other examples and discussing shift to gun-only laws). 
 36. See infra Part III. 
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may not consider those policies and questions in crafting and implementing 
doctrine. Unlike Ginsburg’s strategy of litigating on behalf of male plaintiffs, 
whilst judges remained aware of discrimination against women,37 non-gun 
weapons are effectively obscured in Second Amendment litigation. 
I consider solutions to guard against the distortionary potential of 
unrepresentative litigation, and I argue that two are most promising, albeit in 
limited ways.38 First, advocates can highlight a broader perspective in briefs. 
In Second Amendment gun litigation, for example, government attorneys 
and supporting amici can do more to convey the scope of arms relevant to the 
judicial analysis. Second, and relatedly, judges who become cognizant that the 
field is both broader and less clear than they assume should espouse 
minimalism and flexibility when establishing precedent. Both solutions, 
though modest, cut against ascendant litigation trends, including an 
increased appetite for widely applicable, rule-based doctrine at the Supreme 
Court. 
This Article does not, and cannot, resolve all questions about how gun-
centricity affects Second Amendment law, let alone about the intersection 
between unrepresentative litigation and doctrinal distortion more generally. 
To be sure, there are innumerable such questions. As this Article shows, 
despite rich scholarship on the connection between litigation and doctrinal 
development, we still know little about why distortion happens in some 
contexts and not others, how the distortion manifests, and what can be done 
to prevent it.  
That makes the task of considering these issues all the more urgent. In 
the Second Amendment context, courts are resolving consequential, life-or-
death issues.39 The Supreme Court is considering the next big Second 
Amendment case, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.40 The time 
 
 37. See DE HART, supra note 5, at 258–59 (describing express recognition at oral argument 
in Califano v. Goldfarb that “[m]any of the laws that appeared to discriminate against men . . . also 
discriminated against women”). 
 38. See infra Part IV. 
 39. Well over 100,000 people are shot every year and nearly 40,000 die from their injuries. 
See WISQARS — Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION (July 1, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
JM8M-TTBG]; see also Philip J. Cook & Harold A. Pollack, Reducing Access to Guns by Violent 
Offenders, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS. 2, 4 (2017) (noting increased risk of death when 
a firearm, as opposed to another weapon, is present during confrontation). Beyond deaths and 
injuries, weapons use can adversely affect public safety in other ways. See generally Joseph Blocher 
& Reva Siegel, When Guns Threaten the Public Sphere: A New Account of Public Safety Regulation under 
Heller, 116 NW. L. REV. 139 (2021) (describing how guns can be used to intimidate others in 
ways that threaten constitutional democracy); Eric Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second 
Amendment Doctrine, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149 (2017) (exploring how guns can adversely 
affect others beyond deaths and injuries). 
 40. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Corlett, No. 20-843, 2021 WL 1602643, at *1 (U.S. Apr. 
26, 2021) (granting certiorari on the question “[w]hether the State’s denial of petitioners’ 
applications for concealed-carry licenses for self-defense violated the Second Amendment”). The 
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is now, before ill-considered doctrinal trajectories are set, to take stock of the 
broader picture.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II situates the Article within the 
literature on litigation and doctrinal development, showing why a case study 
can be especially illuminating. Part III presents the Article’s case study. 
Section III.A describes the breadth of Second Amendment “arms” and 
establishes the gun-centricity of litigation. Section III.B contends that gun-
centric litigation is an unrepresentative paradigm for considering how 
Americans exercise Second Amendment rights. Section III.C argues that this 
unrepresentative litigation paradigm contributes to analytical distortions that 
accrue to the benefit of broader gun rights: the exaggeration of burdens and 
the misuse of history. Part IV provides broader takeaways and potential 
solutions. Section IV.A considers challenges to highlighting the scope of a 
constitutional field in litigation but contends that amici are well placed to do 
so. Section IV.B argues that judges should exercise judicial modesty and 
flexibility in circumstances prone to unrepresentative litigation and 
accompanying distortion. 
II. UNREPRESENTATIVE CASES AND ANALYTICAL DISTORTION 
Judges establish doctrinal rules and standards for a broader range of 
disputes than the case at hand. Whether we consider the “actual malice” rule 
from New York Times v. Sullivan;41 the one person, one vote test from Reynolds 
v. Sims;42 a test turning on judicial appraisals of eighteenth-century 
understandings;43 or any other judicially crafted doctrine, the effect is the 
same: to guide decisionmaking in future, similar cases. This basic aspect of 
adjudication is well established, whether we call it judicial lawmaking, 
 
case name changed to “Bruen” when Kevin Bruen replaced Keith Corlett as the superintendent 
of New York State Police. 
 41. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (“The constitutional guarantees 
require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a 
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was 
made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”). 
 42. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that state legislative districts 
need to have roughly equal populations and setting out one person, one vote standard). 
 43. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
45–46 (1997) (acknowledging descriptive truth regarding a patchwork of interpretive standards, 
but defending public meaning originalism as a sole interpretive method that presents fewer 
“difficulties and uncertainties” than alternatives). But see generally J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, 
COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO 
SELF-GOVERNANCE (2012) (critiquing “cosmic” theories that arose in the second half of the 
twentieth century and calling for a return to judicial modesty and restraint). This Article accepts 
the descriptive reality that judges exercise human agency to choose doctrine they think best in a 
given context. See Jamal Greene, Essay, The Age of Scalia, 130 HARV. L. REV. 144, 166–67 (2016) 
(noting that each constitutional right “bears its own bespoke doctrinal formula.”). 
A4_RUBEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2021  3:20 PM 
182 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107:173 
doctrinal development, or something else.44 Judges then implement that 
doctrine in individual cases. But the cases judges use to assess the law’s 
meaning, devise workable doctrine, and execute it are often unrepresentative 
of the range of disputes on a given issue.45 They can be unrepresentative in 
various ways—in terms of their procedural posture, remedial posture, factual 
posture, and so on. 
A basic aspect of the American adjudicatory process, encapsulated by the 
federal “case” or “controversy” limitation on judicial power,46 is that judges 
generally do not issue advisory opinions proclaiming “what the law would be 
upon a hypothetical state of facts.”47 There are good reasons, including those 
rooted in “separation of powers, democratic theory, [and] the role of the 
courts,” to limit the judicial power to live disputes.48 The Supreme Court has 
opined that this limitation “sharpens the presentation of issues upon which 
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult . . . questions.”49 
But again, judges establish doctrinal precedent in such individual cases 
that applies in others. A risk is that the doctrine established, and the analysis 
conducted, in any given case does not accurately reflect or cannot resolve the 
true range of extant policy issues and questions. And though courts can 
reconsider past doctrine in light of changed understandings,50 “[o]nce core 
doctrinal rules and principles have been established . . . they are not easily 
subject to critical reassessment.”51 Scholarship reveals an incredibly complex 
 
 44. See Leong, Making Rights, supra note 3, at 410 (“It is relatively uncontroversial to say that 
adjudication involves building doctrine through judicial pronouncements rather than merely 
deciding disputes according to preexisting principles.”); Levinson, supra note 3, at 873 
(“Constitutional rights do not, in fact, emerge fully formed from abstract interpretation of 
constitutional text, structure, and history, or from philosophizing about constitutional values.”). 
 45. Of course, there are exceptions. There would not need to be much litigation to reflect 
the field regarding the twenty-dollar threshold for the Seventh Amendment jury right, for 
example. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of 
the common law.”). But when a constitutional provision is vague and underdetermined, like the 
meaning of “arms,” a single case likely will not represent the whole. 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: 
Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (2001) (“Many state courts draw 
heavily from federal justiciability principles . . . .”). 
 47. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937). 
 48. Schauer, supra note 3, at 893. 
 49. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The Court in Baker was speaking of 
“constitutional” questions, id., but the limitation applies to all federal legal disputes. 
 50. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 927, 929 (2006) (describing how constitutional free speech and antidiscrimination 
principles have been influenced by changed understandings of the paradigmatic regulatory 
scenes those principles address). 
 51. See David S. Han, Constitutional Rights and Technological Change, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 71, 
106 (2020); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605 (2001) (“[C]ourts’ early resolutions of 
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picture of a judicial process that can produce distorted doctrine in different 
ways and for different reasons. 
Frederick Schauer, for example, has argued that case-by-case 
adjudication, combined with cognitive biases afflicting all humans, leads to 
doctrinal warping.52 For example, he traces the rule that public officials must 
prove “actual malice” to make out a successful defamation claim to the highly 
distinctive circumstances of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,53 the first time the 
Supreme Court ever considered such a claim. Sullivan was no ordinary 
defamation suit: “[T]he plaintiff was a powerful public official [in Alabama] 
using civil litigation as a way of wielding official power.”54 The lower court 
verdicts awarded damages to Sullivan for an inaccurate advertisement 
published in the New York Times, which Schauer argues “embodied little 
other than the jury’s (and Alabama’s) desire to punish what were perceived 
to be so-called Northern Agitators.”55 Schauer contends that “the 
extraordinarily press-protective and plaintiff-restrictive ‘actual malice’ rule, a 
rule endorsed by no country in the world,” can be traced to how the Justices 
evaluated such “idiosyncratic features” of the case.56 In particular, what 
cognitive psychologists call the “availability heuristic”57 means that individual 
cases can “so dominate [judges’] thinking that they will make aggregate 
decisions that are overdependent on the particular event and that 
overestimate the representativeness of that event within some larger array of 
events.”58 
While Schauer focuses on cognitive biases, other scholars focus on 
different ways that litigation can influence the interpretation and 
implementation of rights. Daryl Levinson persuasively demonstrates how 
remedies often inform the understanding of rights, as opposed to rights 
dictating the available remedies.59 Though he provides many examples, one 
that seems especially clear is the Supreme Court’s reapportionment 
 
legal issues can become locked-in and resistant to change.”); infra notes 331–33 and 
accompanying text (discussing stare decisis).  
 52. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 895. No matter the breadth of the aggregate cases, “there 
is a substantial risk that the common law rulemaker will be unduly influenced by the particular 
case before her . . . believ[ing] that this case is representative of the larger array.” Id. at 894. 
 53. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
 54. Schauer, supra note 3, at 901. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 902; see also id. at 902 n.79 (“[T]he particular facts of the case produced a rule 
almost certainly different from what the same justices of the same Court would otherwise have 
done were they asked simply to make a public figure libel rule, and different from what every 
other open liberal democracy in the world has subsequently decided to do.”). 
 57. Id. at 894–95. 
 58. Id. at 895. 
 59. See Levinson, supra note 3. 
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jurisprudence.60 As he explains, “[i]t has never been obvious that a principled 
interpretation of equal protection or other constitutional values necessitates 
the bright line rule of ‘one person, one vote’ announced in Reynolds v. Sims.”61 
Ultimately, Levinson contends, one person, one vote may have been selected 
as a guiding principle because of “concerns about administrability and 
legitimacy unrelated to the ‘pure’ constitutional value of political equality.”62 
Nancy Leong builds on Levinson’s analysis, showing how facts and 
procedures also contribute to the context in which judges create and 
implement doctrine.63 In particular, she contends that “Fourth Amendment 
doctrine is warped because most types of Fourth Amendment claims are 
litigated either in criminal prosecutions or in civil actions for money 
damages.”64 The two contexts offer different remedies (exclusion of evidence 
vs. money damages);65 fact patterns (generally, charged/convicted 
defendants vs. uncharged plaintiffs);66 and “procedural mechanisms” 
(appellate courts in criminal cases review lower court fact rulings for clear 
error and usually in the light most favorable to the government).67 The 
upshot, Leong argues, is that the Fourth Amendment is interpreted more 
narrowly in criminal exclusion cases than in civil damages cases.68 
Scholarship on popular movements, meanwhile, highlights how 
paradigm cases can be the result of deliberate, motivated litigation behavior. 
Litigators know that picking the right plaintiffs and making the right 
arguments can advance a movement’s goals. Interest groups execute long-
term, sophisticated, and well-funded strategies that can involve legal losses as 
well as victories.69 As Jack Balkin has written, legally enforceable rights are “a 
 
 60. Id. at 882 (noting the reapportionment history is “a story about remedial concerns 
determining the existence and shape of a constitutional right”). 
 61. Id. at 883. 
 62. Id. at 884 (observing that the remedy “could not be simpler for courts to administer or 
for states to follow” and, “[r]egardless of whether one person, one vote is the best interpretation 
of voting equality, it may have been perceived by the Court as the only feasible way of intervening 
to correct the blatant countermajoritarianism of excessive malapportionment without being 
caught in the illegitimacy of the ‘political thicket’”). Of course, as Levinson notes, it is impossible 
to prove causation between remedy and right, and other scholars defend the one person, one 
vote standard on the basis of moral or political theory. Id. at 883 n.108, 884. 
 63. See Leong, Making Rights, supra note 3; Leong, Improving Rights, supra note 3. 
 64. Leong, Improving Rights, supra note 3, at 388. 
 65. Id. at 388–89. 
 66. Id. at 390–91. 
 67. Id. at 391–92. 
 68. Id. at 388. 
 69. WEINRIB, supra note 3, at 12 (noting that the American Civil Liberties Union sometimes 
“raised claims they expected to lose”). 
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source of power,”70 and ideology and politics play a role in what cases get 
litigated and what arguments get raised.71 
One famous example is the one raised in the introduction: Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s advocacy as director of the Women’s Rights Project. Ginsburg’s 
selection of male plaintiffs in order to trigger enhanced judicial scrutiny of 
gender-based discrimination in cases like Califano v. Goldfarb is well 
documented.72 Of course, women, not men, are most frequently the target of 
gender discrimination. Another example of such motivated litigation is the 
early development of free speech doctrine. Laura Weinrib’s and Timothy 
Zick’s recent accounts are illustrative.73 Weinrib shows, for example, how free 
speech cases at the Supreme Court between the World Wars were litigated 
almost exclusively by one advocacy organization, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”),74 which used “free speech as a neutral precept” in an 
attempt to bolster labor rights.75 Zick explores how “[s]trategic decisions by 
constitutional movements and rights activists” led, in part, to the over-
expansion of speech rights to the detriment of non-speech rights 
encompassed in the First Amendment—the Free Press, Assembly, Petition, 
and Free Exercise clauses.76 
To be sure, I am not assigning any nefarious meaning to impact litigation 
nor to social movements, which serve a crucial role in shaping “the social 
 
 70. Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 57 (2004) (noting that constitutional 
rights “are a powerful form of rhetorical appeal, and . . . the enforcement of rights recognized by 
the state is backed up [by] the power of the state”). 
 71. See id. (noting that vindicating rights, therefore, can further a group’s “ideals, interests, 
and agendas: For the discourse of rights is the discourse of power, the restructuring of rights is 
the restructuring of power, and the securing of rights is the securing of power”). 
 72. See generally STREBEIGH, supra note 5, at 65–66 (“Ginsburg hoped to show that 
discrimination against either sex ultimately hurt both.”); DE HART, supra note 5, at 256–63 
(discussing Ginsburg’s advocacy in Califano v. Goldfarb); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 204 
(1977) (addressing the constitutionality of a “gender-based distinction . . . burdening a widower 
but not a widow”). 
 73. WEINRIB, supra note 3; ZICK, supra note 3. 
 74. See WEINRIB, supra note 3, at 9. Weinrib observes that the ACLU “was involved in virtually 
every important free speech case in the federal courts between its founding in 1920 and the 
Second World War.” Id. 
 75. Id. at 2, 5. Weinrib describes how the ACLU’s initial goal of buttressing labor rights 
nonetheless failed. Id. at 9. 
 76. See ZICK, supra note 3, at 122–23. For example, “starting in the 1980s, in both their 
general advocacy and litigation of specific cases, religious liberty advocates started to abandon 
the Free Exercise Clause in favor of the Free Speech Clause.” Id. at 33. In a similar way, litigants 
chose to rely on the Free Speech Clause even when their cases might “fit more comfortably within 
the history and language of the Assembly Clause.” Id. at 82. “In order to make space for the 
exercise of religious rights in public places, courts have sometimes bent and stretched free speech 
doctrines and concepts in ways that are likely to complicate their application in other contexts.” 
Id. at 125; see also JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 
(2012) (examining dynamics that subordinated the Assembly Clause to the Free Speech Clause). 
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meaning of constitutional principles and the practices they regulate.”77 Nor 
am I suggesting that unrepresentative litigation necessarily leads to meaningful 
or problematic distortions. Indeed, to the contrary, I argue in Part IV that 
there are ways to mitigate such distortion. Rather, my more modest point is 
that unrepresentativeness exists in litigation and can distort the judicial 
analysis. Moreover, just as no two cases are alike, the causes of distortion can 
vary between legal areas, as can their manifestations, consequences, and solutions. 
In light of the seemingly infinite ways litigation can be unrepresentative 
and distort doctrine, case studies can be helpful for elucidating when, why, 
and how analytical distortions arise and are problematic during the 
adjudicatory process.78 The Second Amendment makes a good case study for 
at least two reasons. First, the Second Amendment is still in its doctrinal 
infancy. The most important Second Amendment case, District of Columbia v. 
Heller, “is younger than the first iPhone.”79 As a result, there has yet to accrue 
the amount of Supreme Court precedent that has solidified doctrinal 
trajectories for other constitutional rights.80 It is thus easier to perceive the 
relationship between litigation asymmetries and the judicial analysis because 
the judicial analysis is not yet dictated by binding precedent. Second, and 
relatedly, the Supreme Court seems poised to establish a doctrinal trajectory 
for the right to keep and bear arms, recently granting a petition for certiorari 
in Bruen after a decade with little appetite for adjudicating Second 
Amendment disputes.81 As a result, the time is ripe to take stock of the 
representativeness of Second Amendment litigation before the next big case.  
 
 77. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 50, at 929. 
 78. See Miller, supra note 6, at 386 (discussing how legal case studies can “generate, refine, 
question, or challenge extant theoretical frames”); cf. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE 
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT, at xxix (1979) (“I am not convinced 
that current knowledge of criminal court processes is well developed, and unless or until there is 
a substantial body of carefully drawn descriptive and inductive research on which typologies can 
be drawn and until classifications are made, the benefits of an analysis of a single setting may be 
as great as, if not greater than, those of comparative studies.”). 
 79. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 80. For example, Timothy Zick has observed that “the basic principles” set forth in the early 
free speech cases “would later become modern Free Speech Clause doctrine.” ZICK, supra note 3, 
at 122; see also id. (“[I]t is only a slight exaggeration to say that one could teach nearly all of these 
fundamental principles simply by studying the Hughes Court decisions.”). 
 81. After the Supreme Court turned down ten certiorari petitions in Second Amendment 
cases at the end of the end of the 2019 term, sources reported that Chief Justice John Roberts 
signaled to conservative justices that he might not join them in overturning gun control 
regulations. Joan Biskupic, Behind Closed Doors During One of John Roberts’ Most Surprising Years on 
the Supreme Court, CNN (July 27, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/27/politics/john-roberts-
supreme-court-liberals-daca-second-amendment/index.html [https://perma.cc/DET4-46UR]. The 
nomination of Amy Coney Barrett to replace Ruth Bader Ginsburg has shifted the Court’s 
alignment on the Second Amendment, which will likely lead to more gun cases on the docket. 
See Adam Liptak, Barrett’s Record: A Conservative Who Would Push the Supreme Court to the Right, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/us/politics/barretts-record-a-
conservative-who-would-push-the-supreme-court-to-the-right.html [https://perma.cc/7XVH-65PH] 
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The next Part focuses on one aspect of modern Second Amendment 
litigation: its gun-centricity. My focus on that variable should not be read to 
suggest that other aspects of modern Second Amendment litigation do not 
also influence the shape of emergent doctrine. If the survey of scholarship in 
this Part teaches anything, it is that many inputs—indeed, even more than 
those discussed here82—are at play in adjudication. But isolating gun-
centricity permits a much deeper look at how a single variable can be 
unrepresentative and lead to analytical distortions. That, in turn, both 
furthers our understanding of the Second Amendment and provides a 
datapoint for evaluating the more generalized accounts of unrepresentativeness 
discussed in the last few pages. 
III. THE GUN-CENTRIC SECOND AMENDMENT 
Guns are one category of post-Heller arms out of many. Yet, guns are 
overwhelmingly the subject of Second Amendment litigation and 
commentary. This Part exposes the breadth of arms, considers whether 
doctrine should nonetheless be biased in favor of guns, and contends that 
gun-centricity is distorting the Second Amendment analysis in meaningful ways. 
A. OBSCURED SCOPE OF ARMS 
In many ways, the gun-centric view of the Second Amendment was seeded 
decades before the Supreme Court decided Heller. Scholars have described 
the efforts by gun rights advocates to bring about the now-dominant view that 
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms 
for private self-defense.83 Beginning in the 1970s, the National Rifle 
Association (“NRA”), for example, funded essay contests, book reviews, and 
even endowed a professorship.84 Nineteen of the twenty-seven articles written 
in the 1970s and 1980s espousing the view that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right to bear arms “were written by lawyers who had 
been directly employed by or represented the NRA or other gun rights 
 
(“Judge Amy Coney Barrett, President Trump’s pick for the Supreme Court, has compiled an almost 
uniformly conservative voting record in cases touching on . . . gun rights . . . .”). 
 82. See, e.g., ZICK, supra note 3, at 111 (“[I]nternal Court agenda-setting may have 
influenced the move toward the Free Speech Clause.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional 
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658–67 (2005) (noting 
that a range of factors influence the construction of judicial decision rules, including institutional 
competence, costs of error, frequency of unconstitutional action, legislative pathologies, and 
enforcement costs). 
 83. See, e.g., FRANKS, supra note 16, at 61–75; COLE, supra note 16, at 97–148; WALDMAN, 
supra note 16, at 87–137. 
 84. See FRANKS, supra note 16, at 64. 
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organizations.”85 Ultimately, that view broke into mainstream politics, 
especially within the Republican Party,86 whose platform now provides:  
We uphold the right of individuals to keep and bear arms, a natural 
inalienable right that predates the Constitution and is secured by the 
Second Amendment. Lawful gun ownership enables Americans to 
exercise their God-given right of self-defense for the safety of their 
homes, their loved ones, and their communities.87 
According to some commentators, “the NRA is almost singlehandedly 
responsible for” bringing about the “now-dominant view” that the Second 
Amendment protects a personal right to arms for self-defense.88 In 2008, after 
the individual-rights understanding of the Second Amendment was 
established in scholarship and accepted by the public, it was endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in Heller.  
I am simplifying this story, which has received full treatment elsewhere,89 
in order to get to the oft-neglected fact that is most relevant to this Article: 
only one “arm,” the firearm, was at issue in the run-up to Heller.90 The NRA 
has focused on firearms since its inception as a hunting and sharp-shooting 
organization after the Civil War.91 The Republican Party Platform addresses 
“[l]awful gun ownership.”92 The leading book on Heller is titled Gunfight.93 
And Heller, of course, ruled on the constitutionality of a gun restriction.  
Yet the Second Amendment does not mention “firearms,” but rather 
speaks of “arms.”94 And though Heller was a gun case, the Court’s interpretation 
of the Second Amendment extended constitutional protection far beyond 
guns. Heller rejected the understanding—reflected in United States v. Miller 
 
 85. Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 3, 8 (2000). 
 86. See Siegel, supra note 8, at 215–26. 
 87. REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 2016, at 12 
(2016), https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5B1%5Dben 
_1468872234.pdf [https://perma.cc/DPE7-2NN6]; see also Siegel, supra note 8, at 212–15 
(showing how the shift on guns within the Republic Party was motivated by a coalition of gun 
rights advocates). 
 88. FRANKS, supra note 16, at 61. 
 89. See Id., at 54–103; COLE, supra note 16, at 95–139; WALDMAN, supra note 16, at 141–60. 
 90. Mary Anne Franks’s critical analysis is a notable exception to the overall neglect of the 
gun-centricity in commentary about the Second Amendment. Franks links the gun-centricity in 
Heller to “constitutional fundamentalism” and “the unequal allocation of constitutional benefits 
and burdens on women and minorities.” FRANKS, supra note 16, at 48. 
 91. See WALDMAN, supra note 16, at 87–102 (describing origins and evolution of the NRA); 
see also generally ERIC RUBEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE GUN RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND “ARMS” 
UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT (June 29, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ 
files/2021-06/Ruben_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X8Q-ZJWF] (discussing the focus of the NRA 
and other gun rights groups on expanding gun rights, not weapons rights more broadly). 
 92. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 93. ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA (2011). 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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(1939)—that the militia clause limits the scope of the Second Amendment.95 
Rather, the Court held that the Second Amendment protects at its core an 
individual right centered around private self-defense.96 Consistent with that 
interpretation, the Court defined “arms” as any “[w]eapons of offence” or 
“thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands,” that is 
“carri[ed] . . . for the purpose of ‘offensive or defensive action.’”97 The Court 
was unambiguous about the breadth of the term. “[T]he Second Amendment 
extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even 
those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”98 Put another 
way, the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess 
and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”99 
To be sure, Heller did not say all “thing[s],” “instruments,” and “weapons” 
receive protection. The Court qualified that the Second Amendment is “not 
a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever 
and for whatever purpose,”100 but the Court articulated few exceptions to its 
broad definition. The Court “read Miller to say only that the Second 
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes,”101 which has led to a baseline inquiry of 
whether an arm is “in common use” for lawful purposes.102 The Supreme 
Court also said that “dangerous and unusual” weapons are not protected, but 
failed to explain what falls into that category other than “M-16 rifles and the like.”103 
What instruments are protected by the self-defense-centered Second 
Amendment after Heller? The list is likely long. Indeed, Heller itself references 
both knives and bows and arrows.104 In one of the few non-gun-focused articles 
on the Second Amendment, David Kopel, Clayton Cramer, and Joseph Olson 
argue that the knife is “the most common ‘arm’ in the United States”: 
“[A]lmost every home has several kitchen knives lying in drawers or in a block 
 
 95. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (upholding a restriction on sawed-off 
shotguns because they did not have a “reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency 
of a well regulated militia”). 
 96. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599, 630 (2008). 
 97. Id. at 581, 584 (alteration in original) (citing SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 106 (4th ed. 1773) and TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW 
DICTIONARY (1771)). 
 98. Id. at 582. 
 99. Id. at 592 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 626. 
 101. Id. at 625. 
 102. Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 581–82 (citing CUNNINGHAM, supra note 97, and JOHN TRUSLER, THE DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN WORDS, ESTEEMED SYNONYMOUS, IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, AND, THE PROPER CHOICE 
OF THEM DETERMINED 37 (3d ed. 1794)); id. at 590 (citing PETER BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 359 (1968)) (noting “Quaker frontiersmen were forbidden to use arms to defend their 
families,” but must have been tempted on occasion “to seize a hunting rifle or knife in self-defense” 
(emphasis added)). 
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on the kitchen counter.”105 “In a practical sense,” they conclude, “the most 
frequent way that Americans exercise their Second Amendment rights is by 
owning and carrying knives.”106 They suggest that the fact that knives can be 
used at the dinner table, or primarily are used in that way, should not 
undermine their Second Amendment status. Indeed, the same could be said 
for guns valued for hunting and target shooting but rarely used for self-
defense. 
Lest there be doubt about the protected status of knives, courts have 
agreed that they are Second Amendment arms, even if some balk at Heller’s 
implication that virtually all common knives count,107 or disagree on whether 
some are “dangerous and unusual.”108 The leading post-Heller case involving 
knives is State v. DeCiccio,109 in which the Connecticut Supreme Court held that 
“dirk knives”—which the Court described as “nearly synonymous with the 
dagger”110—are arms for the purposes of the Second Amendment.111 
Consistent with DeCiccio, courts after Heller overwhelmingly assume or 
conclude that knives fall within the Second Amendment’s scope.112 
And knives barely scratch the surface. For example, electrical weapons 
like stun guns almost surely receive protection. In fact, the Supreme Court 
effectively said as much in Caetano v. Massachusetts.113 Jaime Caetano was 
suspected of shoplifting and searched by the police, revealing a stun gun.114 
The officers were satisfied Caetano had not stolen anything but arrested her 
on a separate charge for violating Massachusetts’s ban on possession of 
electrical weapons.115 At issue was whether a stun gun, a thoroughly modern, 
 
 105. Kopel et al., supra note 12, at 168, 195–96. 
 106. Id. at 215. 
 107. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Evans, 366 P.3d 906, 910–14 (Wash. 2015) (concluding that 
dirk knives are constitutionally protected but that a paring knife is not). 
 108. Compare Lacy v. State, 903 N.E.2d 486, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (switchblade knives are 
not protected under Second Amendment), with State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610, 614 (Or. 1984) 
(switchblade knives protected under Oregon’s constitutional right to keep and bear arms).  
 109. See generally State v. DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165 (Conn. 2014) (determining if “dirk knives” 
found in defendant’s car are protected by the Second Amendment). 
 110. Id. at 193. The Court acknowledged that the “dirk knife” defies a single, precise 
definition. Id. 
 111. Id. at 197. 
 112. See, e.g., Muhannad v. Peterson, No. 8:16-CV-349, 2017 WL 5956892, at *4 (D. Neb. 
Mar. 13, 2017), aff’d per curiam, 718 Fed. App’x 452, 453 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The Court assumes, 
without deciding, that knives intended for self-protection might fall within the scope of Second 
Amendment protection.”); Evans, 366 P.3d at 914–15 (opining that dirk knives are 
constitutionally protected, while concluding that a paring knife is not); Commonwealth v. Fox, 
No. 17-P-1540, 2018 WL 5660598, at *2 (Mass. Ap. Ct. Nov. 1, 2018) (“Assuming without 
deciding that knives such as that carried by the defendant are ‘arms’ within the meaning of the 
Second Amendment . . . .”). 
 113. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 412 (2016). 
 114. Id. at 414 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 115. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131J (2018)). Violating the ban on possessing 
electrical weapons was punishable by up to two-and-one-half years imprisonment. Id. at 421 n.1.  
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non-gun weapon,116 counted as an “arm.” If the Second Amendment right 
extended only to firearms, the outcome would be simple—Caetano’s 
challenge would fail despite the fact that stun guns are marketed for self-
defense and possessed by hundreds of thousands of Americans.117 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that stun guns are “not the type 
of weapon that is eligible for Second Amendment protection.”118 If Caetano 
wanted to exercise her right to keep and bear arms, she should “appl[y] for a 
license to carry a firearm.”119  
But every U.S. Supreme Court Justice disagreed with the Massachusetts 
court’s analysis.120 They explained that “Heller rejected the proposition ‘that 
only those weapons useful in warfare are protected,’”121 and clarified that 
covered weapons include “those that were not in existence at the time of the 
founding.”122  
The Supreme Court in Caetano stopped just short of holding that banning 
stun guns violates the Second Amendment,123 but various other courts have 
reached that conclusion. In Massachusetts, after the dismissal of the charges 
in Caetano,124 another challenge to the stun gun ban arose. In Ramirez v. 
Commonwealth, the police stopped a vehicle with a broken taillight and found 
a stun gun in the defendant’s pant pocket.125 The defendant was charged for 
the same crime at issue in Caetano.126 This time, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, “[h]aving received guidance from the [U.S.] Supreme Court 
 
 116. The first patent for stun gun was filed in 1972. See Commonwealth v. Caetano, 26 N.E.3d 
688, 693 (Mass. 2015), judgment vacated by Caetano, 577 U.S. (discussing Weapon for 
Immobilization and Capture, U.S. Patent No. 3,803,463, which was filed on July 10, 1972). 
 117. See Caetano, 577 U.S. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing statistics). 
 118. Caetano, 26 N.E.3d at 693.  
 119. Id. at 695. 
 120. Caetano, 577 U.S. at 412. It should go without saying: This was a striking consensus for 
a Second Amendment case. The other two modern Second Amendment cases, District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), which 
incorporated the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply against state 
and local governments, were decided by a bare majority of the Justices. 
 121. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624–25 (2008)). 
 122. Id. at 411 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582). 
 123. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 94 N.E.3d 809, 814–15 (Mass. 2018) (“The 
Supreme Court did not opine as to whether electrical weapons are protected under the Second 
Amendment or, if they are protected, whether [the Massachusetts ban] is nonetheless 
constitutional.”); Avitabile v. Beach, 277 F. Supp. 3d 326, 335 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[T]he 
Caetano majority did not actually make any affirmative pronouncements about the continuing 
permissibility of the Massachusetts stun gun ban.”). But see GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 212 F. Supp. 3d 1348, 1359 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (“Most recently, 
in Caetano v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court concluded that a state law banning possession of 
a stun gun violated the Second Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
 124. The case “was ‘resolved . . . to [the parties’] mutual satisfaction.’” Ramirez, 94 N.E.3d at 
811 (alteration in original).  
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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in Caetano[,] . . . conclude[d] that stun guns are ‘arms’ within the protection 
of the Second Amendment.”127 That same conclusion was reached by a federal 
court in New York and the Illinois Supreme Court.128 Currently, only Hawaii 
and Rhode Island have electrical weapon bans that have not been struck 
down,129 though both are subject to ongoing litigation.130 
Knives and electrical weapons hardly exhaust the scope of non-gun 
“arms.” There is no case law, for example, regarding the Second Amendment 
status of chemical devices like pepper spray,131 but they almost surely count 
under Heller’s definition. Chemical sprays have been marketed to the public 
for self-defense for a half-century and are popular because they are both easy 
to use and generally non-lethal to a user’s family, bystanders, and 
aggressors.132  
The simplest and oldest weapon, meanwhile, is the impact weapon.133 
Courts have held that impact weapons like police batons and even nunchaku 
are covered by the Second Amendment.134 
 
 127. Id. at 815. 
 128. Avitabile v. Beach, 368 F. Supp. 3d 404, 411 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding that electrical 
weapons easily passed the “common use” inquiry because there were “at least 300,000 tasers and 
4,478,330 stun guns owned by private citizens across the United States”); People v. Webb, 131 
N.E.3d 93, 96 (Ill. 2019) (“Stun guns and tasers may be taken into one’s hands and used both 
for defense or ‘to cast at or strike another.’ Clearly, stun guns and tasers are bearable arms within 
the meaning of the second amendment.”). 
 129. New Jersey voluntarily terminated its ban on stun guns, albeit after being sued on 
Second Amendment grounds. See N.J. Second Amend. Soc’y v. Porrino, No. 16-4906 (D.N.J. Apr. 
25, 2017) (consent order staying any and all further proceedings in the matter for a period of 
180 days). 
 130. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-16 (West 2019); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-47-42 
(West 2012); O’Neil v. Neronha, No. 1:19-cv-00612 (BL) (D.R.I. Nov. 22, 2019); Roberts v. 
Ballard, No. 1:18-cv-00125, (BL) (D. Haw. Apr. 2, 2018). 
 131. In one recent case, a petitioner challenged a conviction for possessing “a Tear Smoke 
CN grenade” manufactured by Smith & Wesson in violation on Texas’s restriction on 
“intentionally and knowingly possessing a chemical dispensing device.” Stauder v. Stephens, No. 
2:13-CV-11, 2016 WL 922192, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2016), report and recommendation 
adopted, Stauder v. Stephens, No. 2:13-CV-11, 2016 WL 1029540 (N.D. Tex. 2016). The court 
concluded that the chemical “grenade” at issue was not a Second Amendment “arm,” basing the 
conclusion on, among other things, the unusualness of the weapon for personal self-defense. Id. 
at *9. Texas’s restriction on “chemical dispensing device[s]” exempts “small chemical dispenser[s].” 
Id. at *3. 
 132. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at 143. 
 133. M. Mirazón Lahr et al., Inter-Group Violence Among Early Holocene Hunter-Gatherers of West 
Turkana, Kenya, 529 NATURE 394, 394–98 (2016) (describing the use of clubs and bludgeons in 
the late Pleistocene and early Holocene eras). 
 134. State v. DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165, 197–98 (Conn. 2014) (overturning prohibition on 
transportation of police batons); Maloney v. Singas, 351 F. Supp. 3d 222, 239–40 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(overturning prohibition on nunchaku). These decisions on the constitutional protection 
afforded to impact weapons comport with decisions interpreting state constitutional analogues 
to the Second Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 100 (Or. 1980) (overturning 
conviction for possession of two billy clubs in the defendant’s apartment pursuant to a restriction 
on “possession of a slugging weapon”). 
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And, similar to how guns and knives are arguably “arms” no matter 
whether they are owned or used for purposes other than self-defense, the 
same might be said of countless blunt force objects. Baseball bats are a classic 
example. Websites feature them as an inexpensive option for personal 
protection,135 advise about which specific bat is preferable for self-defense,136 
and instruct on how to use them for that purpose.137 Some percentage of the 
many millions of Americans who own baseball bats almost surely consider 
them part of their self-defense strategy.138 Baseball bats might be the most 
obvious example of a common instrument also considered a weapon, but they 
are by no means the only one.139 
Indeed, the line between purposely-designed weapons and “improvised” 
weapons is exceedingly thin.140 The criminal law has long recognized this 
reality. Butcher knives, for example, were so frequently used as a weapon in 
 
 135. See, e.g., Best Non-Lethal Self Defence Weapons in 2021, GEARHUNGRY (Jan. 16. 2018), 
https://www.gearhungry.com/best-non-lethal-self-defence-weapons [https://perma.cc/6FKA-J6A8]; 
Sean Tirman, The 10 Best Non-Lethal Self Defense Weapons for Home Security, HICONSUMPTION (Apr. 
13, 2021), https://hiconsumption.com/best-non-lethal-self-defense-weapons [https://perma.cc 
/2TG6-WRNN]. 
 136. See, e.g., Best Bat for Home Defense, BAT DIG. (2021), https://www.batdigest.com/blog/ 
best-bat-home-defense [https://perma.cc/N9RT-WJCN]; Vijay Singh, Best Baseball Bat for Self 
Defense and Home Protection, BASEBALL GUIDE (May 24, 2021), https://thebaseballguide.com/bat-
for-self-defense [https://perma.cc/NVN6-MLYZ]. 
 137. Mike Trout, How to Use a Baseball Bat for Home Defense, BASEBALL BATS (2021), 
https://thebaseballbats.com/baseball-bat-for-home-defense [https://perma.cc/L3BT-FRXC]. Alas, 
it appears this is not the Mike Trout. 
 138. According to one source, 16 million people in the United States play baseball every year. 
Rachel Bachman, Is it 2019 or 1919? Baseball Is One of America’s Hottest Sports, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 
2019, 5:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-it-1919-or-2019-baseball-is-one-of-americas-
hottest-sports-11550613795 [https://perma.cc/26XH-X68H]. Many more surely own bats. It is 
hard to know how many of those people consider their baseball bat to be a self-defense weapon. 
In Russia, where baseball is not popular, hundreds of thousands of baseball bats are bought 
annually, apparently for use as weapons. See Ted Berg, Report: Russians Buy Tons of Baseball Bats 
and Almost No Balls, FOR THE WIN (Sept. 1, 2016, 10:54 AM), https://ftw.usatoday.com/ 
2016/09/russia-baseball-bat-sales-skyrocketing-yikes-road-rage [https://perma.cc/L6VF-62MR] 
(reporting 500,000 bat purchases and their use for confrontations). 
 139. In 2018, for example, a university in Michigan purchased 2,500 hockey pucks that it 
distributed to faculty and students for use in the event of an active shooter. Emily Sullivan, For 
Defense Against Active Shooters, University Hands Out Hockey Pucks, NPR (Nov. 28, 2018, 3:09 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/11/28/671394863/for-defense-against-active-shooters-mich-school-
hands-out-hockey-pucks [https://perma.cc/9GH4-5PCL]. According to the university police 
chief, throwing the hockey puck at a gunman “would probably cause some injury” and, moreover, 
“students could ‘rush’ an active shooter with their pucks” and thereby create a distraction. Id. 
 140. This thin line is underscored by the fact that purposely-designed weapons sometimes 
have non-weaponry beginnings. See, e.g., State v. Muliufi, 643 P.2d 546, 549 (Haw. 1982) 
(suggesting “that nunchaku sticks were originally designed as a farmer’s tool used to separate 
chaff from the grain, similar to a thresher. However, nunchakus developed into a defensive 
weapon against the samurai’s sword.”). 
A4_RUBEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2021  3:20 PM 
194 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107:173 
the 1800s that they were regulated as such.141 Similarly, modern criminal law 
considers ordinary objects to be weapons for the purposes of aggravated 
assault.142 
Self-defense law, too, has long considered ordinary objects to serve as self-
defense weapons, which is highly relevant given that self-defense is the core 
interest protected by the Second Amendment under Heller. In State v. Wells, 
which was decided a year before the Second Amendment was ratified,143 the 
court rejected Wells’ claim of self-defense in large part because he chose a 
club over less lethal instruments not designed primarily as weapons: “[N]ear 
the place where he took up the club with which he struck the deceased there 
were also the handle of a dung-fork, some blacksmith’s hammers, and some 
old scythes, any of which the prisoner might have taken in his hand as easily 
as the club with which he gave the mortal stroke.”144  
Courts have had few opportunities to address the Second Amendment 
status of lawfully owned instruments like baseball bats. In a non-precedential 
case decided soon after Heller, a court assumed that a walking stick could be a 
Second Amendment arm,145 though the court nonetheless upheld a 
prohibition on carrying the walking stick into a library for other reasons.146 
There has been more litigation on improvised weapons under state 
constitutional rights to keep and bear arms, and judges and commentators 
disagree about whether an instrument must be designed or marketed as a 
weapon to receive state constitutional protection as an arm.147 There is 
 
 141. See, e.g., REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS, ADOPTED AT THE OCTOBER 
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF SAID STATE 280 (William Mck. Ball & Sam C. Roane eds., 
1838) (“Every person who shall wear any . . . butcher or large knife . . . concealed as a weapon, 
unless upon a journey, shall be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.”). 
 142. See, e.g., 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 (West 1973) (stating that a “deadly 
weapon” for the purposes of aggravated assault includes a “device or instrumentality which, in 
the manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury”); Commonwealth v. McCullum, 602 A.2d 313, 323 (Pa. 1992) (explaining 
that deadly weapon definition can accommodate “[a]n ax, a baseball bat, an iron bar, a heavy 
cuspidor, and even a bedroom slipper” depending on the circumstances). 
 143. State v. Wells, 1 N.J.L. 424, 424 (1790). 
 144. Id. at 426. 
 145. See Aderinto v. Sessions, No. 3:08-2530-JFA-PJG, 2009 WL 2762514, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 
26, 2009). 
 146. In particular, the court held that a library is a “sensitive place” where arms can be 
restricted after Heller. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)). In 
another case, a court rejected a plaintiff’s argument that a cell phone he used to record probation 
officers counted as an “arm,” explaining that it is not a “weapon” of either offense or defense. 
Benzing v. North Carolina, No. 3:17-CV-000619-KDB-DCK, 2020 WL 3439558, at *6 (W.D.N.C. 
June 23, 2020), aff’d sub nom. Benzing v. Treadway, 827 Fed. App’x 350 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 147. In Washington, for example, a court concluded that covered arms are those “that are 
designed as weapons traditionally or commonly used by law abiding citizens for the lawful 
purpose of self-defense,” and in making the determination the court considers “the historical 
origins and use of that weapon” and “the weapon’s purpose and intended function.” Seattle v. 
Evans, 366 P.3d 906, 913 (Wash. 2015) (en banc). Under that test, the court determined that a 
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nothing in Heller limiting the scope of arms in that way. Moreover, limiting 
arms to objects purposely designed as weapons would have the counter-
intuitive effect of privileging certain extremely lethal weapons (like guns) 
over less lethal alternatives (like baseball bats), running afoul of both what 
the law of self-defense counts as a “weapon” and how that law operates to steer 
conflicts away from unnecessary lethal violence.148 To be sure, how to define 
an “arm” or “weapon” is a difficult question that has received too little 
scholarly attention after Heller. In any event, regardless of whether baseball 
bats and the like receive Second Amendment protection, the basic point is 
the same: Covered arms after Heller undeniably encompass much more than 
firearms. A corollary is that the shape of Second Amendment doctrine 
implicates a much broader regulatory context than gun laws—it implicates 
the regulation of all private weapons in America. 
Yet non-gun cases make up only a tiny fraction of Second Amendment 
litigation. In another article, Joseph Blocher and I conducted an empirical 
study of Second Amendment case law.149 As of February 2016, there were over 
1,000 post-Heller challenges to restrictions on guns and fewer than twenty to 
restrictions on nonlethal weapons.150 When, as here, there appears to be a 
litigation imbalance, it is important to ask why. After all, it is possible that what 
appears as skewed litigation can be explained in a way that justifies any 
resulting doctrinal implications. The next Section considers that question for 
gun-centric Second Amendment litigation.  
B.  OBSCURED EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT 
The asymmetry between gun and non-gun cases would not be 
problematic if any resulting distortions are justified by the gun’s exalted 
Second Amendment status. Before analyzing ways gun-centricity is 
influencing doctrine, I consider whether the gun deserves pride of place in 
post-Heller jurisprudence despite the fact that more Americans possess knives, 
 
paring knife is not covered. Id. A dissenting judge and some scholars, however, define the scope 
of protection much broader and would consider the paring knife a covered fixed-blade knife akin 
to a dirk knife. See id. at 918–20 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting); Kopel et al., supra note 12, at 194 
n.146 (asserting the categorical view after Heller that any knives that may be useful for self-defense 
receive Second Amendment protection, and opining that knives that are useless for self-defense, 
like butter knives, would not receive protection). Historically, some English legal scholars 
understood the scope of what counts as an “arm” broadly, encompassing even sticks and stones 
when used as a weapon. Jonah Skolnik, Observations Regarding the Interpretation and Legacy of the 
Statute of Northampton in Anglo-American Legal History, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS L. (Sept. 17, 2021), 
https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/2021/09/observations-regarding-the-interpretation-and-legacy-
of-the-statute-of-northampton-in-anglo-american-legal-history/#_ftn2 [https://perma.cc/PA95-
LEDK] (discussing the work of Henry de Bracton and Edward Coke). 
 148. See Ruben, supra note 12, at 82–89 (describing the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality in self-defense law). 
 149. See generally Ruben & Blocher, supra note 13 (analyzing post-Heller Second Amendment 
cases through February 1, 2016).  
 150. See id. at app. C, xxiv. 
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blunt force objects, and other non-gun instruments used for self-defense. I 
briefly raise three explanations for the primacy of guns that, even if true, are 
insufficient for tailoring post-Heller doctrine to firearms: the usefulness of 
guns for fighting a tyrannical government, a regulatory gap between guns and 
non-gun weapons, and the intensity gap between gun owners and other 
weapon owners (and the related prominence of the gun rights movement). I 
then consider, empirically and historically, the explanation suggested in 
Heller: that firearms are simply more popular for self-defense. 
The Supreme Court in Heller did not rule out that the Second Amendment 
protects an interest in opposing a tyrannical government, in addition to 
private self-defense. That interest would inherently call for a right to especially 
lethal weapons like guns. Yet, if tyranny-fighting is a Second Amendment 
purpose after Heller, it would be a narrow one. It might support a right to 
possess a gun and separately-stored bullets in the home, sufficient opportunity 
to train, and other lawful militia-related activities.151 It would not seem 
pertinent, however, for deciding the sorts of post-Heller questions that most 
often arise, like whether there is a right to be perennially armed in public with 
a loaded handgun or to have one unlocked on the bedside table. A tyrannical 
government will not spontaneously appear; neither will the opportunity to 
oppose it with handguns. 
Another explanation for the litigation imbalance would be that guns are 
more regulated than non-gun weapons and, thus, are more frequently the 
subject of Second Amendment cases. But while weapons such as pepper spray 
are regulated differently and less strictly than guns in some regards,152 in 
others they are regulated similarly to or even more strictly than guns.153 
Moreover, even to the extent that guns are more regulated than non-guns, 
that does not mean that the Second Amendment should be construed with 
only guns in mind. For one thing, the technology for relatively young weapons 
like chemical sprays and tasers is advancing. Tasers, for example, have become 
smaller, lighter, and more powerful,154 and will likely attract more regulatory 
 
 151. Many misunderstand the law surrounding private, armed, self-proclaimed “militias.” For 
an inciteful essay on how the law and Constitution relate to private militias, see generally MARY 
B. MCCORD, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., DISPELLING THE MYTH OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT (June 
29, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/dispelling-myth-second-
amendment [https://perma.cc/H7ST-HXFR] (dispelling the notion that the Second Amendment 
supports private militias). 
 152. See infra notes 292–94 and accompanying text. 
 153. Jacobs, supra note 12, at 145–49; Volokh, supra note 12, at 209–16. 
 154. Today, the voltage for a common, small stun gun is 50,000, which can debilitate a victim, 
though some stun gun models carry a voltage in the millions. See Christopher Leake, Police Forces 
on Alert Over Deadly Million-Volt ‘Tasers’ Disguised as Mobile Phones, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2099921/police-forces-alert-deadly-million-volt-Tasers-
disguised-mobile-phones.html [https://perma.cc/7ZX4-Q5W6]; see also Proposed Non-Lethal 
Weapons Won’t Stop Attacks, Says Union, DOMINION POST (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.stuff.co.nz/ 
dominion-post/news/4475609/Proposed-non-lethal-weapons-won-t-stop-attacks-says-union [https:// 
perma.cc/9S49-6KHS] (describing a wireless taser that fires “an electric ‘bullet’ . . . from a 
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attention in the future. More fundamentally, so long as non-gun weapons can 
and do serve the self-defense interest protected by the Second Amendment, 
they should factor into the creation and implementation of Second 
Amendment law.  
Another potential explanation for gun-centric litigation is that gun 
owners are more passionate about firearms and thus more litigious than 
owners of other weapons.155 Among other things, guns are inherently more 
dangerous than most privately owned knives, stun guns, chemical agents, and 
blunt force weapons, and perhaps for that reason they are of greater concern 
to the public, lawmakers, and those pressing for self-defense-related arms 
rights. The cultural and societal importance of guns is undeniable, which sets 
guns apart from other weapons.156  
Litigation and press surrounding Caetano, the stun gun case, is 
illustrative. The fact that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Caetano is 
remarkable, as over 150 petitions in Second Amendment cases have been 
rejected in the thirteen years since Heller.157 The importance of the 
constitutional issue—the Second Amendment’s protection of a non-firearm 
weapon—is undeniable. Yet as with most non-gun litigation, Caetano was 
largely overlooked. When the case reached the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, just two small Massachusetts-based nonprofit organizations 
joined as amici.158 When Caetano petitioned the Supreme Court, those two 
organizations remained the only amici in the litigation.159 The Court’s per 
 
standard pump-action shotgun.”); David Hambling, Long-range Taser Raises Fears Over Shock and 
Impact Injuries, 204 NEW SCIENTIST 24, 24 (2009) (describing research into a “taser grenade” that 
would have a range of almost 200 feet). The potential power helps to explain why electrical 
weapons can and do cause deaths, even if their use is nonlethal in the vast majority of cases. See 
generally Aaron Sussman, Shocking the Conscience: What Police Tasers and Weapon Technology Reveal 
About Excessive Force Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1342 (2012) (exploring the relationship between use 
of electric weapons and excessive force by law enforcement). 
 155. See Jonathan M. Metzl, What Guns Mean: The Symbolic Lives of Firearms, 5 PALGRAVE 
COMMC’NS, no. 35, 2019, at 1, 2  (discussing how “firearms represent forms of selfhood”). 
 156. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting enormous number of deaths and 
injuries caused by guns); CAROLINE E. LIGHT, STAND YOUR GROUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S 
LOVE AFFAIR WITH LETHAL SELF-DEFENSE, at viii-ix (2017) (describing historical and cultural 
prominence of firearms); see also Brad J. Bushman, Patrick E. Jamieson, Ilana Weitz & Daniel 
Romer, Gun Violence Trends in Movies, 132 PEDIATRICS 1014, 1014, 1017 (2013) (finding that 
violent encounters with guns occur more than twice an hour on average among best-selling R- 
and PG-13-rated films, a rate three times as high for PG-13-rated films when compared to 1985). 
 157. See GIFFORDS L. CTR., POST-HELLER LITIGATION SUMMARY (July 2020), https://giffords. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Giffords-Law-Center-Post-Heller-Litigation-Summary-July-
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/GF7Q-AKEV] (“[T]he Supreme Court has declined to review over 
150 Second Amendment cases since Heller.”). 
 158. Commonwealth v. Caetano, 26 N.E.3d 688, 689 n.1 (Mass. 2015), cert. granted, vacated 
sub nom. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (noting the participation of Arming 
Women Against Rape & Endangerment and Commonwealth Second Amendment). 
 159. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, Docket No. 14-10078 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (listing parties).  
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curiam opinion was just two pages long with hardly any analysis.160 That lack 
of depth was mirrored in the media coverage. The New York Times tucked its 
discussion of Caetano into an article titled “Supreme Court Declines to Hear 
Challenge to Colorado’s Marijuana Laws.”161 Caetano reflects the fact that even 
when non-gun Second Amendment cases are litigated—which is relatively 
rare—they tend to evade media and public attention. 
Compare Caetano with challenges to firearms laws. The same term 
Caetano was decided, 41 amici joined briefs at the petition-for-certiorari stage 
in a challenge to a local firearm storage law.162 In a challenge to Maryland’s 
prohibition on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, 70 amici joined 
briefs at that stage.163 The petition for certiorari in a case challenging San 
Francisco’s restriction on carrying handguns in public, meanwhile, attracted 
74 amici.164  
The passion and funding of the gun rights and gun safety movements are 
undeniable. Advocates are eager to vindicate or oppose broader gun rights 
and often well-funded to do so. There is no “National Taser Association” 
comparable to the power and finances of the NRA and other gun rights 
groups who fund and participate in gun cases. The NRA’s Civil Rights Defense 
 
 160. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred to explain in greater 
depth why he believed the electrical weapons ban violated the Second Amendment. Caetano v. 
Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 422 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (per curiam)(complaining that 
the Supreme “Court’s grudging per curiam now sends the case back to” the court that “affirmed 
[Caetano’s] conviction on the flimsiest of grounds.”). In Alito’s view, Heller stands for the 
proposition that any weapon “widely owned and accepted as a legitimate means of self-defense 
across the country” receives Second Amendment protection. Id. at 420. Moreover, in light of the 
constitutional protection afforded to handguns, which are almost always deadlier than stun guns, 
refusing protection for stun guns would be illogical: 
Countless people may have reservations about using deadly force, whether for moral, 
religious, or emotional reasons—or simply out of fear of killing the wrong person. 
“Self-defense,” however, “is a basic right.” I am not prepared to say that a State may 
force an individual to choose between exercising that right and following her 
conscience, at least where both can be accommodated by a weapon already in 
widespread use across the Nation. 
Id. at 421 (citations omitted); see also People v. Yanna, 824 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2012) (“Tasers and stun guns, while plainly dangerous, are substantially less dangerous than 
handguns. Therefore, tasers and stun guns do not constitute dangerous weapons for purposes of 
Second Amendment inquiries.”). 
 161. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Declines to Hear Challenge to Colorado’s Marijuana Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/us/politics/supreme-court-
declines-to-hear-challenge-to-colorados-marijuana-laws.html [https://perma.cc/P55W-R8NV]. 
The media’s inattention to Caetano has continued in articles discussing other Second 
Amendment cases. See Jake Charles, Caetano’s Erasure, SECOND THOUGHTS (Jan. 8, 2020), https:// 
sites.law.duke.edu/secondthoughts/2020/01/08/caetanos-erasure [https://perma.cc/XP3N-6BJ5]. 
 162. See Jackson v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Docket No. 14-704 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (listing 
parties). 
 163. Kolbe v. Hogan, Docket No. 17-127 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (listing parties). 
 164. Peruta v. San Francisco, Docket No. 16-894 (Sup. Ct.) (listing parties). The Supreme 
Court rejected the petitions in Jackson, Kolbe, and Peruta. 
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Fund (“NRA Defense Fund”), for example, states that it has spent about ten 
million “dollars in support of cases involving individuals and organizations 
defending the individual right to keep and bear arms and to support legal 
research and education.”165 The NRA Defense Fund’s goal, of course, is not 
to protect all arms rights but to “establish[] legal precedents in favor of gun 
owners.”166 Another major gun rights group, the Second Amendment 
Foundation (“SAF”), invokes the Second Amendment in its very name, but its 
mission is “promoting a better understanding about our Constitutional 
heritage to privately own and possess firearms.”167 It should come as no surprise 
that each Second Amendment case to receive argument at the Supreme Court 
in recent years was brought by an NRA affiliate.168 
But, under Heller, it is not clear that the passion associated with the 
modern gun rights and gun safety movements should translate to gun-centric 
doctrine implementing the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.169 If 
non-guns are relevant for that purpose, it is hard to justify doctrine that 
ignores them because highly motivated litigants are saturating the courts with 
gun cases.170 
Rather, Heller suggests another explanation that could rationalize gun-
centric doctrine and that warrants close scrutiny: that guns are simply 
preferred by Americans for self-defense. While acknowledging the breadth of 
“arms,” the majority then implied that breadth did not translate to American 
practice. The Court declared that the firearms at issue, handguns, are 
“overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [self-defense].”171 The Court 
added that “American people have considered the handgun to be the 
quintessential self-defense weapon”172 and “the most popular weapon . . . for 
self-defense in the home.”173 The Court did not cite statistics to support these 
statements but instead referenced the lower court opinion.174 That opinion, 
in turn, cited a highly-contested 1995 empirical study about defensive gun 
 
 165. About the NRA Civil Defense Fund, NRA C.R. DEF. FUND (last updated 2021), https:// 
www.nradefensefund.org/about-us.aspx [https://perma.cc/6F3Q-S25R]. 
 166. Id. (“The NRA Civil Rights Defense Fund was established by the NRA Board of Directors 
in 1978 to become involved in court cases establishing legal precedents in favor of gun owners.”). 
 167. Mission Statement, SECOND AMEND. FOUND. (last updated 2021), https://www.saf.org/mission 
[https://perma.cc/P4L6-NKAJ] (emphasis added). 
 168. See generally N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Corlett, No. 20-843, 2021 WL 1602643 (U.S. 
April 26, 2021) (granting certiorari to case brought by firearms owners’ association); N.Y. State 
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (case brought by firearms owners’ 
association and individual firearms license holders).  
 169. Cf. Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2016) (critiquing 
how the wealthiest civil litigants exert an inordinate influence on the rules governing civil procedure). 
 170. See infra notes 195–206 and accompanying text (describing relevance of non-gun 
weapons for self-defense). 
 171. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
 172. Id. at 629. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 628–29 (citing Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).  
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uses,175 which did not opine on firearm possession or usage relative to other 
weapons.176 If it were true that any or all firearms were most popular for self-
defense, that might justify not only a litigation asymmetry, but also doctrinal 
biases in favor of guns.177 
It is thus important to consider closely the relative popularity of firearms 
for private self-defense. The following Sections do so, exploring weapons 
preferences today and at the time of the founding.  
1. Weapons and Self-Defense Today 
The Supreme Court’s declaration that handguns are “overwhelmingly 
chosen by American society for [lawful self-defense]” is an empirical claim for 
which the Court offered no evidence.178 To be sure, there is little doubt that 
firearms are abundant—there are hundreds of millions of them in the United 
States.179 But researchers trace most guns to multiple-gun owners, and about 
half to “super-owners,” 3 percent of the adult population that own 17 guns on 
average.180 The raw number of guns in America is thus insufficient to prove 
Heller’s empirical point about handgun popularity. More probative would 
have been evidence of relative weapons preferences and relative defensive 
weapons usages. 
Surveys can help to evaluate the overlap between firearms, other 
weapons, and self-defense practices today. Of course, surveys are not perfect. 
 
 175. Parker, 478 F.3d at 400 (citing Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The 
Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 182–83 (1995)). 
But see David Hemenway, Survey Research and Self-Defense Gun Use: An Explanation of Extreme 
Overestimates, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1430, 1430 (1997) (“The Kleck and Gertz (K-G) 
paper has now been published. It is clear, however, that its conclusions cannot be accepted as valid.”). 
 176. See generally Kleck & Gertz, supra note 175 (focusing specifically on defensive gun uses). 
Two years after Heller, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court repeated these assertions 
about handgun popularity and reemphasized their significance. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 767–68 (2010) (“Explaining that ‘the need for defense of self, family, and 
property is most acute’ in the home, we found that [the Second Amendment] right applies to 
handguns because they are ‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for 
protection of one's home and family’ . . . . Thus, we concluded, citizens must be permitted ‘to 
use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.’” (citations omitted)). 
 177. To be sure, there still would be reason to critique such a popularity-based doctrine. See 
Eric Ruben, Is the Handgun America’s ‘Most Popular’ Self-Defense Weapon? It’s a Crucial Question at the 
Supreme Court, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/analysis-opinion/handgun-americas-most-popular-self-defense-weapon-its-crucial-question 
[https://perma.cc/MR8D-GRK9] (discussing reasons why, “[a]s a matter of constitutional 
methodology, the [Heller] majority’s decision to peg constitutional protection to a contemporary 
weapon’s popularity is misguided”). 
 178. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
 179. Deborah Azrael, Lisa Hepburn, David Hemenway & Matthew Miller, The Stock and Flow 
of U.S. Firearms: Results from the 2015 National Firearms Survey, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS. 
38, 38 (2017). 
 180. See Lois Beckett, Meet America’s Gun Super-Owners – with an Average of 17 Firearms Each, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/20/gun-ownership-
america-firearms-super-owners [https://perma.cc/XLX9-KU97]. 
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When it comes to self-reported acts of self-defense, for example, there is no 
external validation, and whether someone believes themselves to be a self-
defender as opposed to an unlawful aggressor is often a question of 
perspective.181 Some proportion of proclaimed defensive weapons uses are 
surely unlawful—for example, one study found a majority of self-reported 
defensive gun uses could not be justified as lawful self-defense182—and this 
inflates the numbers. Meanwhile, some gun owners may opt not to reveal their 
gun ownership or usage out of a fear of government confiscation or for some 
other reason,183 which would deflate the numbers. In addition, polling on 
non-gun weapons ownership, carrying, and use is underdeveloped because 
most surveys about weapons focus solely on guns. Moreover, surveys often 
differ from one another in how they ask questions, and comparisons between 
surveys must be qualified accordingly. 
Surveys nonetheless offer more rigor than Heller’s conjecture. This 
Section considers evidence from the National Crime Victimization Survey 
(“NCVS”), a primary source of data on crime victimization in the United 
States;184 the General Social Survey (“GSS”), a “highly respected” source of 
data on household and individual firearms possession;185 and other surveys 
asking questions about relative preferences and usages of guns and other 
weapons.186 These surveys cast doubt on Heller’s assumptions, suggesting 
 
 181. D. Hemenway, D. Azrael & M. Miller, Gun Use in the United States: Results from Two National 
Surveys, 6 INJ. PREVENTION 263, 266 (2000). 
 182. Id.  
 183. See David Yamane, Why Surveys Underestimate Gun Ownership Rates in the U.S., GUN 
CURIOUS (Feb. 11, 2019), https://guncurious.wordpress.com/2019/02/11/why-surveys-
underestimate-gun-ownership-rates-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/2SBA-PNCQ] (suggesting that 
gun ownership rates are higher than commonly used surveys conclude). 
 184. See generally National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (2019), https:// 
bjs.ojp.gov/data-collection/ncvs [https://perma.cc/N6A7-LKYL][hereinafter BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT.] (providing primary source data on crime victimization in the United States). The NCVS is 
far larger than smaller private surveys, like the one relied on by the lower court in Heller, supra 
notes 175–77, for which “the reported self-defense gun uses are too few to provide stable 
disaggregate estimates about the epidemiology of self-defense gun use.” David Hemenway & Sara 
J. Solnick, The Epidemiology of Self-Defense Gun Use: Evidence from the National Crime Victimization 
Surveys 2007-2011, 79 PREVENTATIVE MED. 22, 22 (2015). The NCVS collects data on nonfatal 
crimes reported or unreported to the police from a nationally representative sample of about 
160,000 unique persons in about 95,000 households. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra. Once 
selected, eligible individuals in households are interviewed every six months over the course of three-
and-one-half years about victimization since the last interview. Id. 
 185. PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 3 
(2d ed. 2020). 
 186. See Court TV Poll: March 2001 [Roper #31108618], ROPER CTR. (Mar. 2001), https:// 
ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll/study/31108618/questions#12f85240-dd4c-4ac6-8dd0-ac1bfd831999 
[https://perma.cc/3ABL-4NLD]; Gallup News Service Poll # 2007-33: 2008 Presidential Election 
[Roper #31088846], ROPER CTR. (Oct. 2007), https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll/study/ 
31088846/questions#2dd2df52-9fc8-4d1d-a50e-184a1369ee7e [https://perma.cc/JG4N-WECD]; CBS 
News/60 Minutes/Vanity Fair Poll: Genetically Modified Food/Sports/Gun Control [Roper #31091058], 
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instead that a super-majority of Americans choose not to possess firearms, 
which are used in just a tiny fraction of self-defense situations. As noted above, 
more Americans surely own knives and other objects that can be used as 
weapons.187 And, according to some surveys, when Americans are asked about 
weapon preferences, non-gun weapons are preferred, possessed, and used by 
as many or more Americans.   
According to the NCVS, fewer than 1 percent of crime victims report 
using a gun in self-defense, and roughly the same percentage report using 
another weapon.188 The NCVS reflects demographic variations in weapon 
preferences that I discuss further below.189 Males were more than three times 
as likely to report using a gun in self-defense than females (1.4 percent vs. 0.4 
percent), despite equal likelihood of being crime victims.190 Of course, the 
rate of weapons possession is higher than the rate of usage; most people never 
need to use a weapon for self-protection. The NCVS does not seek to measure 
weapons possession, though the GSS and other surveys do.191 According to 
the GSS, as of 2018, 35 percent of households and 22 percent of individuals 
possess a firearm.192 The percentage of households with firearms has dropped 
over time—in 1977, 54 percent reported owning a gun.193 It is too soon to 
know how the surge in gun sales in 2020 and 2021 will affect these statistics.194
 
ROPER CTR. (Jan. 2013), https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll/study/31091058 [https:// 
perma.cc/D25Q-YXL9] [hereinafter CBS News Poll]. 
 187. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
 188. Between 2007 and 2011, when crime victims were present, they used guns and “other 
weapons” to threaten or attack a perpetrator in roughly equal proportions, and each in less than 
0.9 percent of incidents. Hemenway & Solnick, supra note 184, at 25 tbl.3b; see also MICHAEL 
PLANTY & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT, FIREARM VIOLENCE, 1993-2011, at 12 
(2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fv9311.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PZ4-4734] 
(noting that “about 44% of victims of nonfatal violent crime offered no resistance, . . . 22% 
attacked or threatened without a weapon (e.g., hit or kicked), and 26% used nonconfrontational 
methods (e.g., yelling, running, hiding, or arguing)”). For unknown reasons, those who used 
guns appear to be less likely than those using other weapons to be injured before their gun use, 
but there is no meaningful difference between guns and other weapons in the likelihood of an 
injury during or after weapons use. Id. Likewise, in property crimes, there is little difference in 
whether property is ultimately taken when a gun is used defensively (38.5 percent) as opposed to 
when another weapon is used defensively (34.9 percent). Hemenway & Solnick, supra note 184, 
at 26 tbl.4a. 
 189. See infra notes 200–06 and accompanying text. 
 190. Hemenway & Solnick, supra note 184, at 23–24. 
 191. See COOK & GOSS, supra note 185, at 3. 
 192. Id. Among the Americans who choose to possess a firearm, handguns have become more 
popular, now comprising 60 percent of new purchases. Azrael et al., supra note 179, at 48 tbls.3 
& 4. Cook and Goss note other surveys report individual gun ownership ranging between 22 
percent and 30 percent. COOK & GOSS, supra note 185, at 3. 
 193. COOK & GOSS, supra note 185, at 3. 
 194. See Jaclyn Diaz, 1st-Time Gun Buyers Help Push Record U.S. Gun Sales Amid String of Mass 
Shootings, NPR (Apr. 26, 2021, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/26/989699122/1st-
time-gun-buyers-help-push-record-u-s-gun-sales-amid-string-of-mass-shootings [https://perma.cc/FY 
2K-MWKF]. Data suggests that the surge was driven in part by first-time gun owners. Id. It appears 
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 Meanwhile, Americans widely view non-gun weapons as effective for self-
defense. In 2001, one survey reported that 76 percent of respondents 
believed that “[c]arrying mace, pepper spray, a whistle or similar protection” 
would be “very” or “somewhat” effective “as a way of protecting yourself 
against crime,” as compared to 49 percent who thought the same of 
“[c]arrying a gun, knife or other weapon.”195 In that survey, 33 percent of 
respondents said that they had carried “mace, pepper spray, a whistle or 
similar protection,” compared to 24 percent who said they had carried “a gun, 
knife or other weapon.”196 A 2007 survey reported that more respondents had 
carried pepper spray or mace for self-defense (14 percent) than a gun (12 
percent), and the same percentage had carried a knife (12 percent).197 A 
2013 survey reported the same percentage of people carrying a gun for 
protection (12 percent), though a slightly smaller percentage of people 
carrying pepper spray or mace (10 percent) and a substantially lower 
percentage of people carrying a knife (7 percent).198 Most respondents (66 
percent) reported never carrying any weapons for self-protection.199 
An important consideration captured by some surveys is that weapons 
preferences are not monolithic, but vary by factors such as demographic, 
geography, and political ideology.200 According to the 2013 survey, more 
females carried pepper spray or mace (17 percent) than guns (9 percent), 
while more men carried guns (16 percent) than pepper spray or mace (2 
percent).201 This data may reflect how guns can be “especially impractical and 
dangerous tools for women.”202 Guns in the home, for example, “are 
statistically far more likely to endanger rather than protect women” and are 
associated with a 500 percent increase in the chance a woman is unlawfully 
 
that year-over-year sales for some non-lethal weapons increased at an even higher rate than gun 
sales in 2020. See Stephanie Pagones, Taser Consumer Sales Jumped 300% in 2020 Amid Year of 
Unrest, Violence: CEO, FOX BUS. (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/ 
consumer-taser-sales-spike-2020-unrest-crime [https://perma.cc/U2EW-FH4N]. 
 195. Court TV Poll: March 2001 [Roper #31108618], supra note 186. The language in this 
survey is imprecise and should be qualified accordingly—mace and pepper spray could be viewed 
as “other weapons.” 
 196. Id. (questions 6 and 8). 
 197. Gallup News Service Poll # 2007-33: 2008 Presidential Election [Roper #31088846], supra 
note 186 (questions 36, 37, and 39). Surveys differ in their methodologies and the formulation 
of their questions which could explain discrepancies between them. Conclusions drawn from 
comparing between these surveys should be qualified accordingly. My goal here is not to draw 
such comparisons as between different surveys, but rather to highlight data signaling the relative 
popularity of non-gun weapons for self-defense. 
 198. CBS News Poll, supra note 186 (question 7). 
 199. Id. 
 200. As Professors Philip J. Cook and Kristin A. Goss have observed, “[g]un owners are not a 
representative sample of the American public.” COOK & GOSS, supra note 185, at 4. 
 201. CBS News Poll, supra note 186 (question 7 crosstab). 
 202. FRANKS, supra note 16, at 89. 
A4_RUBEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2021  3:20 PM 
204 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107:173 
killed during domestic violence situations.203 According to one study, women 
in California who brought a handgun into the home for self-defense were more 
likely to be killed by an intimate partner and had a 50 percent higher risk of 
homicide overall.204 
Weapons preferences also vary by geography and political ideology. 
According to the 2013 survey, respondents from the south were more likely 
to have carried a gun (17 percent) than those in the northeast (10 percent), 
northcentral (11 percent), or west (8 percent), and New York and California 
have led a recent surge in taser sales.205 And, perhaps unsurprisingly in light 
of modern gun politics, twice as many liberals had carried pepper spray or 
mace (12 percent) as guns (6 percent), while more than two times as many 
conservatives had carried guns (16 percent) as pepper spray or mace (7 percent).206  
This data complicates Heller’s contention that handguns are 
“overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [self-protection].”207 Although 
many Americans choose guns, most do not, and many prefer other weapons. 
This, in turn, calls into question whether gun litigation is representative of the 
Second Amendment field after Heller, as well as whether modern self-defense 
preferences rationalize doctrine biased in favor of gun rights. 
2. Weapons and Self-Defense at the Founding 
Heller’s discussion of handgun popularity was keyed to modern-day 
preferences, but the majority’s primary temporal focus was the late 1700s. 
The Court set out to understand the right to keep and bear arms in light of 
how it would be understood by “ordinary citizens in the founding 
generation.”208 Some lower-court opinions, taking their cue from Heller, 
highlight the exercise of self-defense at the founding. As one opinion put it, 
“[w]hen the Second Amendment was ratified . . . [f]irearms were considered 
essential for defense of the home and hearth.”209 However, the picture was 
more complex. We know less about self-defense at the founding than today 
 
 203. Id. at 90. 
 204. Garen J. Wintemute, Mona A. Wright & Christiana M. Drake, Increased Risk of Intimate 
Partner Homicide Among California Women Who Purchased Handguns, 41 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 
281, 282 (2003); see also SHERRY F. COLB, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE ROLE OF FANTASY IN THE 
BATTERED WOMAN’S RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 4–5 (2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/research-reports/role-fantasy-battered-womans-right-bear-arms [https://perma.cc/R8GH-
F2AC] (explaining how guns can be unhelpful for women trying to defend themselves at home 
in domestic violence situations).  
 205. CBS News Poll, supra note 186 (question 7 crosstab); Pagones, supra note 194 (noting 
that more tasers are sold to consumers in California and New York than any other states). 
 206. Id. 
 207. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
 208. Id. at 576–77. 
 209. Mai v. United States, 974 F.3d 1082, 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J., 
dissenting) (characterizing the Second Amendment as protecting, at the founding, “the core 
right of gun ownership for self-defense of the home”). 
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because there was nothing like today’s surveys and studies to provide estimates 
of defensive weapons uses. Much of what we do know, however, suggests that 
non-gun weapons may have been as or more important than guns for private 
self-defense. 
Scholars have spilt plenty of ink establishing the commonness of gun 
ownership during the founding era,210 but less on how frequently firearms 
were possessed or used for “lawful” and “immediate” self-defense—what Heller 
pronounced as the “core” of the Second Amendment right.211 Firearms, of 
course, feature in any narrative about the Revolutionary War (or, for that 
matter, any American military conflict). At the founding, they also were 
important tools for hunting. And formal or informal “shooting [competitions] 
were major events in rural communities.”212 There is substantial overlap 
between Americans who engaged in these activities and those who did so with 
firearms. When we focus on private self-defense, however, the overlap shrinks.  
Although we do not have statistical records of defensive weapons uses, we 
have some data about the flip side of the equation: criminal weapons uses. 
Historian Randolph Roth has documented how firearms were rarely used in 
intrafamilial homicides, for example. He writes, “[f]amily and household 
homicides—most of which were caused by abuse or simple assaults that got 
out of control—were committed almost exclusively with weapons that were 
close at hand,” which were not loaded guns but rather “whips, sticks, hoes, 
shovels, axes, knives, feet, or fists.”213 The same was likely true of 
confrontational situations that called for immediate defensive force. 
In this regard, it is important to keep in mind the state of firearms 
technology at the time. It is easy to project today’s guns back to the colonial 
 
 210. According to probate records, they were owned by at least 50 percent of the population. 
See James Lindgren & Justin L. Heather, Counting Guns in Early America, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1777, 1782 (2002) (providing data based on probate inventories, which “are usually regarded as 
the best source of information about what items of personal property were owned in early 
America, but they are incomplete”); Randolph Roth, Guns, Gun Culture, and Homicide: The 
Relationship between Firearms, the Uses of Firearms, and Interpersonal Violence, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 223, 
224 (2002) (noting “roughly half of all households owned at least one working gun”). 
 211. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630, 635. 
 212. NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, DAVID B. KOPEL, GEORGE A. MOCSARY & MICHAEL P. O’SHEA., 
FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 221 (2d ed. 
2018). Target shooting has long been an internationally recognized sport. The first modern 
Olympics, in 1896, featured five events that involved rifle or pistol shooting. See BILL MALLON & 
TURE WIDLUND, THE 1896 OLYMPIC GAMES: RESULTS FOR ALL COMPETITORS IN ALL EVENTS, WITH 
COMMENTARY 97 (1998). Today, some put the number of participants in target shooting in the 
United States at over 30 million annually. See S. Lock, Number of Participants in Target Shooting in 
the United States from 2006 to 2017 (in millions), STATISTA (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.statista 
.com/statistics/191962/participants-in-target-shooting-in-the-us-since-2006 [https://perma.cc/ 
98DF-T7RH].  
 213. Randolph Roth, Why Guns Are and Are Not the Problem: The Relationship Between Guns and 
Homicide in American History, in A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS? THE CONTESTED ROLE OF HISTORY IN 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT 276 (Jennifer Tucker, Barton C. Hacker 
& Margaret Vining eds., 2019). 
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or founding era, but the reality was much different then. When the first 
Europeans set foot in America, for example, the most common firearms were 
matchlocks, meaning “they were fired by bringing a lighted slow-match into 
contact with the priming powder,”214 after which they were reloaded through 
“a long and complicated procedure.”215 This made them less effective for 
many confrontations than other weapons.216 
Firearms advanced by the time of the founding era but remained limited 
in ways relevant to self-defense confrontations. By the eighteenth century, the 
matchlock was widely replaced by the flintlock,217 a more reliable design. Yet, 
like the matchlocks that preceded them, these founding-era guns were 
muzzle-loaders that were slow to load and generally kept and carried 
unloaded because they were “liable to misfire.”218 
These characteristics obviously limited the usefulness of historical guns 
when it came to private confrontations. As the Texas Supreme Court 
commented over a half-century after the founding, “[t]he gun or pistol may 
miss its aim, and when discharged, its dangerous character is lost, or 
diminished at least. . . . The bowie-knife differs from these in its device and 
design; it is the instrument of almost certain death.”219 Indeed, even in war 
settings during the founding era, “battles were frequently decided in hand-to-
hand combat with the bayonet” because “[o]nce the opposing troops closed 
with each other there was no time to reload.”220 The Revolutionary War battles 
 
 214. HAROLD L. PETERSON, ARMS AND ARMOR IN COLONIAL AMERICA: 1526-1783, at 12 (1956). 
 215. Id. at 15. 
 216. According to one historical weapons expert, the crossbow was more important than the 
matchlock firearms settlers had on hand. See id. at 7. Until the early seventeenth century, common 
firearms remained “so heavy that a forked rest was required to hold the barrel steady in firing.” 
Id. at 14. Even when matchlock firearms became lighter, they remained limited, and “could not 
compete either in speed of firing or in accuracy with the Indian’s arrow.” Id. at 19. 
 217. Id. at 19, 38. 
 218. Roth, supra note 213, at 275 (noting that muzzle-loaded firearms were “liable to misfire” 
and “could not fire multiple shots”). British troops patrolling colonial streets in Boston, for 
example, would carry unloaded muskets and only load before they prepared to fire. See FREDERIC 
KIDDER, HISTORY OF THE BOSTON MASSACRE, MARCH 5, 1770, at 67 (1870) (according to 
deposition of Charles Hobby, the “soldiers load[ed] their muskets about the Custom-house door, 
after which they all shouldered”); id. at 72 (deposition of Peter Cunningham); Id. at 130 
(testimony of Ebenezer Bridgham); id. at 207 (testimony of Joseph Hinkley). Owners of black 
powder guns are still advised to keep and carry their guns unloaded. See, e.g., Muzzleloader Safety 
Rules, REMINGTON (last updated 2021), https://www.remington.com/support/safety-center/safety-
and-shooting-tips/muzzleloader-safety-rules [https://perma.cc/65ZR-B8S3]. In his dissent from 
denial of certiorari in Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote 
that a requirement to store firearms in a locked container or disabled with a trigger lock violated 
the Second Amendment because it would take too much time to load the gun in an emergency 
situation. Jackson v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 576 U.S. 1013, 1013 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). At the founding, however, such delay was inherent given the state of the technology. 
 219. Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 402 (1859). 
 220. See PETERSON, supra note 214, at 199. 
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of Stony Point and the final Yorktown campaign were waged almost entirely 
with bayonets.221 
And what of handguns, which Heller called “the quintessential self-
defense weapon?”222 Only “[a] distinct minority of colonists” owned pistols at 
the time of the founding223—which, according to one historian, made up less 
than ten percent of the firearm stock.224 This, of course, cuts against any 
notion that pistols were commonly owned, let alone used, for self-defense.225  
This account is necessarily tentative because of the lack of framing-era 
surveys, and it should not be read to suggest that firearms were never used or 
valued for private self-defense at the founding. The point, rather, is that if 
private self-defense is to guide Second Amendment doctrine, self-defense 
trends at the founding, like self-defense trends today, do not clearly justify 
doctrine biased in favor of gun rights. The next Section discusses how, 
nonetheless, gun-centric litigation is resulting in such biased doctrine. 
C.  WARPED ANALYSIS 
Gun-centricity has distorted the Second Amendment analysis, including 
in two ways that are used by some judges to explain the invalidation of gun 
laws. First, courts neglecting non-gun alternatives have exaggerated the 
burden imposed by gun restrictions, leading to hasty conclusions that gun 
regulations are unconstitutional. Second, some judges have been too quick to 
embrace purely historical tests for deciding Second Amendment cases without 
appreciating the challenges such doctrine will present for non-gun weapons. 
When looking for historical precedent, meanwhile, judges have misconstrued 
1800s weapons cases by overlooking the fact that those cases focused on 
regulations applicable to a broad range of weapons, not gun-only policies. 
The result, again, has been flawed arguments for striking down gun laws, this 
time on the basis of inapt historical analogies. 
 
 221. See id. at 200 (“At Stony Point the muskets were unloaded and American bayonets alone 
carried the day.”); id. (“Washington in the climatic Yorktown campaign exhorted his men to place 
their principal reliance on the bayonet.”); see also Baron von Steuben Shows the Army a Bayonet Is Not 
a Grilling Tool, NEW ENG. HIST. SOC’Y (2018), https://www.newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/ 
baron-von-steuben-shows-the-army-a-bayonet-is-not-a-grilling-tool [https://perma.cc/932U-F77D] 
(describing increased use of bayonets during war). 
 222. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008). 
 223. Kevin M. Sweeney & Saul Cornell, All Guns Are Not Created Equal, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER 
EDUC. (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.chronicle.com/article/all-guns-are-not-created-equal/?bc_no 
nce=yl4ezgqxk1fr1nyysqdip&cid=reg_wall_signup [https://perma.cc/QP2D-MPLG]. 
 224. Kevin M. Sweeney, Firearms, Militias, and the Second Amendment, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
ON TRIAL 310, 342 (Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich eds., 2013); see also ROBERT SPITZER, 
GUNS ACROSS AMERICA: RECONCILING GUN RULES AND RIGHTS 31–37 (2015) (discussing gun 
ownership at the founding); JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 212, at 142–43 (discussing common gun 
models in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). 
 225. But see GEORGE C. NEUMANN, BATTLE WEAPONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 230 
(2011) (“Civilians commonly carried pocket-size [pistols] for protection whenever traveling.”). 
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1. Distorting Burdens and Neglecting Alternatives 
In a gun-centric world in which the only “arm” is a firearm, firearms 
restrictions intuitively cut deeper into the right to keep and bear arms than in 
a world where there are myriad alternatives. Heller, for example, despite 
defining “arms” broadly, nonetheless failed to actually consider the gun law 
at issue in that broader context. This failure may have been due to the Court’s 
unsupported declarations that the handgun is the “the most popular weapon 
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home,” “overwhelmingly chosen 
by American society for [lawful self-defense],” and “the quintessential self-
defense weapon” according to “the American people.”226 As discussed above, 
these are questionable empirical statements.227 In one place in its discussion, 
the Court abruptly switched the frame to just firearms, contending that 
handguns are “the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for 
protection of one’s home and family.”228 That narrower framing (firearms 
instead of weapons) accompanied the Court’s conclusion that the Second 
Amendment burden imposed by the D.C. handgun ban was so severe that no 
further analysis was necessary: “Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we 
have applied to enumerated constitutional rights,” banning handgun 
possession in the home “would fail constitutional muster.”229 
One way to conceptualize the gun-centric distortion at play in Heller is as 
a denominator problem.230 If the denominator is all conduct protected by a 
right, and the numerator is the subset of that conduct subject to a regulation, 
then the larger the numerator relative to the denominator the closer the 
regulation gets to a total “ban” on protected conduct. And, once a court 
“characterize[es] . . . a law as a ban[, that] tends to trigger a per se rule of 
invalidity . . . .”231 As Joseph Blocher has shown, if the relevant denominator 
is a “class of arms,” then courts must decide what counts as such a class.232 
There has been insufficient consideration about the appropriate 
denominator in Second Amendment cases, including whether the 
denominator is static across regulatory contexts (restrictions on home 
possession versus public carry, for example). If the right to bear arms is viewed 
 
 226. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29. 
 227. See supra Section III.B.1. 
 228. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (emphasis added) (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 
478 F.3d 379, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 229. Id. The Court spent just seven pages considering the handgun ban at issue, id. at 628–
35, after devoting 55 pages to analyzing whether the Second Amendment protected an individual 
right centered around private self-defense, id. at 573–628. 
 230. See Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308, 343–51 (2019) (discussing the Second 
Amendment’s denominator problem). 
 231. Id. at 314; see also id. at 325 (“[T]here can be little doubt that where the Court sees a 
ban, it is more likely to strike the law down.”). 
 232. Id. at 351 (quoting Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). 
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through a functional lens,233 the denominator should arguably be set broadly 
at arms adequate for self-defense, the “core” interest protected by the Second 
Amendment.234 
Yet Heller did not consider non-gun arms in its discussion of handguns 
and neither do lower courts. Lower court judges rely on Heller’s assumption 
that handguns are the “quintessential self-defense weapon” to exaggerate, or 
for non-guns deflate, Second Amendment burdens. On one hand, they 
minimize the burden imposed by restrictions on non-handguns, scrutinizing 
restrictions to such weapons less stringently than they would a handgun 
restriction. In a recent case involving the regulation of butterfly knives, the 
district court emphasized “Heller’s unique concerns about handguns” which 
are “overwhelmingly chosen by American society for th[e] lawful purpose [of self-
defense].”235 Heller, the lower court noted, “made much of” the handgun’s 
status as “the ‘quintessential self-defense weapon.’”236 That “prominent 
discussion” and the “special consideration” afforded handguns meant that a 
ban on a different weapon was scrutinized less strictly.237 In fact, as discussed 
above, surely more Americans own knives than guns.238 Similarly, in a case 
involving nunchaku, a federal district court focused on the fact that, “unlike 
handguns, nunchaku are not considered ‘the quintessential self-defense weapon,’ 
by ‘the American people,’ and thus a ban on their possession arguably does 
not impose nearly the same burden as a handgun ban on the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.”239 Again, 
more Americans undoubtedly possess blunt force instruments than guns.240 
On the other hand, courts conclude that general firearm restrictions or 
specific handgun restrictions impose the severest burden possible on the 
Second Amendment. Without considering non-gun weapons at all, judges 
declare that firearm restrictions “destroy[]” or “eviscerate” the Second 
Amendment and therefore require “Heller-style per se invalidation.”241  
This phenomenon is evident in lower court cases addressing the issue 
pending now before the Supreme Court in Bruen: the constitutionality of strict 
 
 233. See id. at 342 (contending this is arguably the most appropriate lens). 
 234. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
 235. Teter v. Connors, 460 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1002 (D. Haw. 2020) (emphasis and alterations 
in original). 
 236. Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 629). 
 237. Id. at 1005 (citation omitted). After comparing to handgun bans, the court called the 
butterfly knife ban a “modest infringement” on the Second Amendment right and applied 
intermediate scrutiny. Id. 
 238. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
 239. Maloney v. Singas, 106 F. Supp. 3d 300, 311 n.17 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Heller, 554 
U.S. at 629). 
 240. See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying text. 
 241. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated on reh’g 
en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 946 (9th Cir. 
2016) (en banc) (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
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permitting requirements for publicly carrying handguns for self-defense. 
These laws generally require a showing of heightened need to carry a 
handgun for self-defense—something separating the permit applicant’s 
security needs from the general public.242 They typically do not, however, 
address the right to carry other arms.243 
When a Ninth Circuit panel considered such a handgun permitting 
requirement, the panel struck down the law after declaring that “regulations 
affecting a destruction of the right to bear arms,” which is how the panel 
characterized the handgun permitting law, “cannot be sustained under any 
standard of scrutiny.”244 In another opinion about handgun carry permits, a 
dissenting judge wrote that the licensing regime “eviscerates the Second 
Amendment right of individuals to keep and bear arms as defined by Heller 
and reaffirmed in McDonald.”245 An opinion out of the D.C. Circuit concluded 
that requiring a showing of good cause before receiving a permit to carry a 
concealed handgun “destroys the ordinarily situated citizen’s right to bear 
arms.”246 These courts made these absolutist pronouncements without so 
much as mentioning the possibility of carrying other arms. 
This gun-centric distortion is also evident for other Second Amendment 
issues. For example, a judge wrote that disqualifying felons from possessing 
guns “criminaliz[es] exercise of the [Second Amendment] right entirely.”247 
Similarly, a district judge opined that a gun restriction targeting the mentally 
ill “completely eviscerate[s] Second Amendment rights.”248 Given that the Second 
Amendment protects far more than gun possession, the impingements in 
these cases are less total than these judges suggest, and the Second 
Amendment analysis should be adjusted accordingly. Judges should not rely 
 
 242. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2021) (providing for concealed 
carry licenses for applicants if they show “proper cause”); Klenosky v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 428 
N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (1980), aff’d, 421 N.E.2d 503 (N.Y. 1981) (interpreting “proper cause” under 
Penal Law § 400.00(2)(f) to require “a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that 
of the general community”). 
 243. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 2021) (titled “Licenses to carry, possess, 
repair and dispose of firearms”). This is not to say that the carrying of other arms is not regulated. 
It often is, including in New York. The point is that challenged public carry restrictions generally 
address only a single arm, and the judicial analysis in cases considering those restrictions is 
likewise focused on that single arm. 
 244. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1175 (emphasis added and omitted). 
 245. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 946 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 246. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (emphasis added); 
see also id. (characterizing the law as a “destruction of so many commonly situated D.C. residents’ 
constitutional right to bear common arms for self-defense in any fashion at all” and a ban “on the 
ability of most citizens to exercise an enumerated right”). 
 247. Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 358 (3d Cir. 2016) (Hardiman, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
 248. Keyes v. Sessions, No. 1:15-cv-457, 2017 WL 11068791, at *16 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (emphasis 
added) (arguing that 18 U.S.C. “§ 924(g)(4) operates to completely eviscerate Second Amendment 
rights”). 
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on notions of the “destruction” of the right in these cases to short-circuit 
scrutiny and deem gun laws unconstitutional. 
Considering gun-centricity begs a related question of whether Second 
Amendment doctrine should expressly look to alternatives to guns as a reason 
to insulate gun laws from Second Amendment challenges, at least in some 
contexts. At first blush, such an analysis was foreclosed by Heller. The Court 
stated that “[i]t is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to 
ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms 
(i.e., long guns) is allowed.”249 Heller’s statement, which makes no mention of 
other types of arms, has subsequently been used to oppose doctrine that 
would justify any gun restrictions on the basis of alternative arms.250  
In an earlier Article, I argued that a Second Amendment alternatives 
analysis that considers the availability of sufficient, less lethal weapons is a 
logical extension of the self-defense requirement of necessity.251 In particular, 
self-defense law considers whether lethal defensive force was reasonably 
perceived as necessary, which in turn calls for an inquiry into reasonable 
alternatives to lethal force.252 Second Amendment law arguably should not 
stray from the law regulating its core interest of self-defense, in which case the 
availability of alternative arms (especially less lethal ones) might factor into 
the doctrine.253 Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller have likewise argued that 
considering alternatives would harmonize Second Amendment law with First 
Amendment law, which takes into consideration whether time, place, and 
manner restrictions “leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”254 Appreciating the vast scope of 
alternative “arms” used for self-defense confrontations enhances these 
arguments. 
As a practical matter, considering alternatives could be especially helpful 
in explaining why certain widely-accepted firearm restrictions pass 
constitutional muster. For example, consider the constitutionality of 
restrictions on possessing weapons following a felony conviction. Such laws 
 
 249. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008).  
 250. See, e.g., Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 421 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(citing Heller’s statement in support of the notion that “the right to bear other weapons is ‘no 
answer’ to a ban on the possession of protected arms”); Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 161–62 
(4th Cir. 2017) (Traxler, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (arguing that an alternatives analysis 
was “expressly rejected” by Heller). 
 251. Ruben, supra note 12, at 79, 103–04. 
 252. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Essay, A Right to Bear Firearms but Not to Use Them? Defensive 
Force Rules and the Increasing Effectiveness of Non-Lethal Weapons, 89 B.U. L. REV. 251, 253 (2009) 
(noting that “a person with a tenth degree karate black belt who shoots a knife-wielding attacker 
when he could instead safely and easily disarm the attacker with an expert kick” cannot assert 
that the shooting was justified, because it was unnecessary). 
 253. Ruben, supra note 12, at 103–104, 105. 
 254. See Blocher & Miller, supra note 12, at 291 (quoting Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981)). 
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exist in every jurisdiction in the country.255 Challenges to them are regularly 
rejected,256 but the rationale for rejection is intensely debated.257 Some courts 
and commentators have asserted that a criminal conviction completely 
removes a person from the Second Amendment’s coverage.258 Others have 
taken a different approach, concluding that convictions do not automatically 
or permanently carve people out from the Second Amendment’s 
protection.259 Then-Judge Amy Coney Barrett, in particular, questioned 
whether it is appropriate to conceive of a person as losing Second Amendment 
rights entirely following a conviction.260 Justice Barrett’s skepticism comports 
with how we think about other individual rights.261 But how, then, are we 
supposed to rationalize what Barrett nevertheless characterized as the 
“common sense” conclusion “that legislatures have the power to prohibit 
dangerous people from possessing guns”?262 
This is a context where Heller (likely, inadvertently) is consistent with a 
role for alternative arms. The Supreme Court cautioned that “nothing in 
[the] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons,”263 which of course is narrower than a 
 
 255. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018) (criminalizing possession of firearms by a person 
“who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year”); RESTORATION OF RIGHTS PROJECT, 50-STATE COMPARISON: LOSS & 
RESTORATION OF CIVIL/FIREARMS RIGHTS (July 2021), https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-
restoration-profiles/chart-1-loss-and-restoration-of-civil-rights-and-firearms-privileges [https:// 
perma.cc/6GUN-XJRT] (conducting a 50-state survey). A smaller number of jurisdictions impose 
similar limitations on the possession of other types of weapons like stun guns and pepper spray. 
See Volokh, supra note 12, at 226; Jacobs, supra note 12, at 149. 
 256. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 13, at 1481. 
 257. See generally Jacob D. Charles, Defeasible Second Amendment Rights: Conceptualizing Gun Laws 
that Dispossess Prohibited Persons, 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (2020) (discussing conceptual 
debate regarding how to think about categorical firearm disqualifications). 
 258. See, e.g., United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding “that 
statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not 
offend the Second Amendment,” and holding that Section 922(g)(1) is “a constitutional avenue 
to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people,” including convicted felons); 
see also Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 413 (2009) (“Heller categorically excludes certain types of ‘people’ and ‘Arms’ 
from Second Amendment coverage, denying them any constitutional protection whatsoever.”). 
 259. See, e.g., Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2016) (granting as-
applied relief to two plaintiffs challenging the federal felon-in-possession law, 18 U.S.C.  
§ 922(g)(1)) (en banc); United States v. Woolsey, 759 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting 
that “the Eighth Circuit has left open the possibility that a person could bring a successful as-
applied challenge to § 922(g)(1)” but rejecting defendant’s as-applied challenge because he had 
multiple violent felony convictions); see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 442–45 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(describing circuit split). 
 260. See Kanter, 919 F.3d at 451–53 (Barrett, J., dissenting). 
 261. See generally Charles, supra note 257 (comparing, for example, how courts have limited 
free speech under the First Amendment to how courts have limited Second Amendment rights). 
 262. Kanter, 919 F.3d at 451 (Barrett, J., dissenting). 
 263. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (emphasis added). 
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prohibition on possession of all arms. The relevant question in a world in 
which there is more than one type of arm arguably should be whether it is 
constitutional to take one highly lethal arm off the table after a conviction, 
not whether it is permissible to remove Second Amendment rights 
completely. Framed in this way, a conviction puts in jeopardy a person’s gun 
rights, but not all Second Amendment rights. This relates back to the 
discussion of burdens: When viewed through the lens of all covered arms, 
felon-in-possession laws simply do not, as one judge put it, “completely 
eviscerate[] the Second Amendment right.”264 Similar reasoning could apply 
in other contexts, including restrictions on publicly carrying handguns that 
do not foreclose the carrying of less lethal arms.  
To be sure, it is easy to imagine an alternatives analysis going too far and 
resulting in an anemic Second Amendment right. As one judge observed in a 
stun gun case, “the baseball bat [the plaintiff] already owns certainly counts 
as the type of thing a determined person could pick up and use for self-
defense. What other self-defense weapons could be banned by pointing to 
baseball bats as a so-called ‘adequate alternative?’”265 A challenge would be 
how to implement an alternatives analysis in a way that does not under-protect 
the right to keep and bear arms. Considering alternatives might make more 
sense in some contexts (like the rights to carry weapons in public or to possess 
them following a conviction) than others (like the right to possess weapons in 
the home). This Article should not be read to minimize the challenge of 
articulating a workable alternatives analysis, which deserves much more 
judicial and scholarly attention.266  
 
 264. See, e.g., Binderup, 836 F.3d at 364. 
 265. Avitabile v. Beach, 368 F. Supp. 3d 404, 417 (N.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 266. Another counterargument to the consideration of alternatives is that the Second 
Amendment protects an unqualified interest in weapon choice or autonomy, which “resonates 
with the strongly libertarian flavor of much gun-rights rhetoric.” See Joseph Blocher & Darrell 
A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second 
Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 348–50 (2016) (considering various possible theoretical 
underpinnings of the Second Amendment, including autonomy). This perspective can be 
gleaned in a recent, now-vacated, opinion about large-capacity magazines, where a Ninth Circuit 
panel opined that “the Second Amendment limits the state’s ability to second-guess a citizen’s 
choice of arms if it imposes a substantial burden on her right to self-defense.” Duncan v. Becerra, 
970 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 988 F.3d 1209 (9th 
Cir. 2021). The opinion went on to defer to those who “find solace in the security of a handgun 
equipped with [a large-capacity magazine],” striking down a prohibition on magazines holding 
more than 10 rounds. Id. Accepting a Second Amendment interest in unfettered weapon choice 
would, of course, undercut the doctrinal import of the breadth of personal weaponry. It also 
would have other far-reaching implications, expanding the Second Amendment right well 
beyond the current judicial consensus. Cf. Blocher & Miller, supra at 349 (suggesting a Second 
Amendment autonomy interest could overexpand the Second Amendment). Bans on 10-plus-
round magazines, for example, have been upheld by every federal appeals court to consider 
them, despite the fact that many Americans may “find solace” in owning them. Duncan, 970 F.3d 
at 1141. A less-than-absolute interest in weapon choice, in contrast, might accommodate some 
role for alternatives. The intersection of the Second Amendment and individual autonomy is yet 
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2. Over-relying on and Misreading History 
Gun-centric litigation has contributed to other doctrinal problems, 
including as regards the use and misuse of history. To set the stage, this 
Section first summarizes an ongoing debate about the appropriate 
methodology to apply in Second Amendment cases. 
The dissenting Justices in Heller complained that the majority failed to 
provide “a framework for constitutional analysis.”267 The majority’s retort was 
simple: “one should not expect [the Court] to clarify the entire field” in its 
“first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment.”268 In the years after 
Heller, questions about the appropriate methodology to apply have featured 
prominently in Second Amendment litigation, with a consensus approach 
emerging, accompanied by a dissenting view. 
Every federal circuit to decide the methodological issue has adopted a 
two-part framework borrowed from other areas of constitutional law.269 First, 
courts inquire whether regulated conduct, people, or weapons fall within the 
scope of the Second Amendment.270 Second, if so, the court then evaluates 
the law under either intermediate or strict scrutiny depending on the law’s 
burden on the right to keep and bear arms.271 This approach is flexible—indeed, 
flexible enough to accommodate and incorporate a range of weapons. But it 
is vehemently contested in some dissenting opinions as being either too lax 
or inconsistent with Heller.272 
The leading doctrinal alternative is the THT test raised in the 
introduction.273 Then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh, for example, opined that “Heller 
established that the scope of the Second Amendment right—and thus the 
constitutionality of gun bans and regulations—is determined by reference to 
text, history, and tradition.”274 Subsequently, other judges have similarly 
 
another theoretical issue about the right to keep and bear arms that warrants more scholarly 
attention. 
 267. Heller, 554 U.S. at 722 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 268. Id. at 635 (majority opinion). 
 269. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 
F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A two-step inquiry has emerged as the prevailing approach  
. . . .”); see also N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting 
that the two-part methodology had been largely adopted by “the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits”). 
 270. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 271. Id. 
 272. See, e.g., Mai v. United States, 974 F.3d 1082, 1087 (2020) (Bumatay, J., dissenting) (“It 
is difficult to square the type of means-ends weighing of a government regulation inherent in the 
tiers-of-scrutiny analysis with Heller’s directive that a core constitutional protection should not be 
subjected to a ‘freestanding “interest-balancing” approach.’”). 
 273. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 274. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1272–73 (D.C. Cir. 2011)(Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting). 
A4_RUBEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2021  3:20 PM 
2021] LAW OF THE GUN 215 
called for adopting this judicial test.275 With the changed composition of the 
Supreme Court, including the elevation of Justice Kavanaugh, THT may 
appeal to a majority of the Justices. Indeed, after the most recent Second 
Amendment case at the Supreme Court was rejected as moot,276 four Justices 
cryptically voiced “concern that some federal and state courts may not be 
properly applying” Second Amendment doctrine.277 Soon thereafter, the 
Court denied ten pending certiorari petitions, prompting two Justices 
similarly to bemoan the Court’s willingness to tolerate “blatant defiance” of 
its Second Amendment precedent.278 
But THT has not been evaluated outside the gun-centric context. Indeed, 
Kavanaugh wrote that THT is relevant for determining “the constitutionality 
of gun bans and regulations.”279 To be sure, even in gun cases, THT does not 
always provide clear answers,280 something that even proponents of a strictly 
historical approach acknowledge.281 But the problems multiply as we consider 
weapons more broadly.  
Even for weapons with a long lineage, like knives, history may prove 
indeterminate. Historical regulations precluded the carrying of certain large 
 
 275. See, e.g., Mai, 974 F.3d at 1087 (Bumatay, J., dissenting) (critiquing the two-step approach 
and advocating for THT); United States v. McGinnis, 956 F.3d 747, 762 (5th Cir. 2020) (Duncan, 
J., concurring) (same); Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 127 
(3d Cir. 2018) (Bibas, J., dissenting) (same); Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 398 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(Willett, J., dissenting) (same); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 702 (6th Cir. 
2016) (Batchelder, J., concurring) (same); id. at 710 (Sutton, J., concurring) (same). 
 276. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020). 
 277. Id. at 1527 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (noting that he shared that concern with Justice 
Alito, whose opinion was in turn joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch). Justice Alito, for his 
part, wrote, “[w]e are told that the mode of review in this case is representative of the way Heller 
has been treated in the lower courts. If that is true, there is cause for concern.” Id. at 1544 (Alito, 
J., dissenting). 
 278. Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1867–68 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh on this point); see also Brian Naylor, Barrett, An 
Originalist, Says Meaning of Constitution ‘Doesn’t Change Over Time’, NPR (Oct. 13, 2020, 10:08 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/live-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-confirmation/2020/10/13/92 
3215778/barrett-an-originalist-says-meaning-of-constitution-doesn-t-change-over-time [https:// 
perma.cc/NDU6-FUEE] (explaining Justice Barrett’s endorsement of originalism and textualism). 
 279. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1272–73 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 280. There are no clear historical reference points, for example, for “ghost guns” designed 
to stonewall criminal investigations. See United States v. McSwain, No. CR 19-80, 2019 WL 
1598033, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2019) (describing a “ghost gun” as “a weapon that lacks a serial 
number [and] . . . is therefore untraceable by law enforcement”). Moreover, as Judge J. Harvie 
Wilkinson has observed, “true history is often tentative and qualified” and historical research is 
“often inconclusive.” WILKINSON, supra note 43, at 42, 51. Judges have concluded as much when 
trying to draw on history to decide gun cases. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 
81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) (“History and tradition do not speak with one voice here.”). 
 281. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[A]nalyzing the history and 
tradition of gun laws in the United States does not always yield easy answers.”).  
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knives like the “Bowie knife.”282 Today, like the nineteenth century regulation 
of Bowie knives, legislators are concerned with blade length. Unlike the 1800s 
regulations, however, modern laws speak more precisely about permissible 
lengths. In Chicago, carried knives must be less than two and one-half 
inches.283 In Los Angeles, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Vermont, the 
permissible length is up to three inches.284 In Colorado, it is unlawful to carry 
a concealed knife longer than three and one-half inches.285 In Connecticut, 
the maximum length is four inches, unless the knife is an “automatic” or 
“stiletto,” in which case it is restricted to one and one-half inches.286 Iowa and 
North Dakota bar public carry of knives longer than five inches.287 The 
historical restriction on Bowie knives will do little to assist courts in 
determining the constitutionality of a restriction on carrying blades longer 
than two and one-half inches versus four inches versus five inches. Yet, such 
difficulties, which are bound to arise in future non-gun cases, are out of view 
for judges advocating for THT. 
New weapons technology, meanwhile, begets new regulatory approaches 
and novel constitutional issues. Consider chemical sprays, whose potency 
depends on the chemical used,288 concentration,289 grind,290 and viscosity.291 
Michigan and Wisconsin limit the active ingredient for pepper spray 
(oleoresin capsicum) to no more than 18 percent or 10 percent 
respectively.292 Wisconsin also prohibits the sale of pepper sprays with a range 
 
 282. See, e.g., 1837-38 Tenn. Pub. Acts 200–01, An Act to Suppress the Sale and Use of Bowie 
Knives and Arkansas Tooth Picks in this State, chapter 137, § 2. Though “there is no one specific 
knife that can be exactingly described as a Bowie knife,” the defining attribute appears to be their 
large size. Kopel et al., supra note 12, at 181 (quoting NORM FLAYDERMAN, THE BOWIE KNIFE: 
UNSHEATHING AN AMERICAN LEGEND 490 (2004)). 
 283. MUN. CODE CHI. § 8-24-020(f) (2021). 
 284. L.A. MUN. CODE § 13.62.010 (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.226 (West 2021); 
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-42(3) (2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 4013 (2021). 
 285. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-12-105(1)(a), 18-12-101(f) (West 2021). 
 286. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-206(a) (West 2021). 
 287. IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.7 (West 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-01-01 (West 2021). 
 288. The first chemical spray widely available for defensive purposes was phenacyl chloride 
(“CN”), or tear gas. See ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., LAURIE O. ROBINSON & JOHN H. LAUB, U.S. DEPT. OF 
JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., POLICE USE OF FORCE, TASERS AND OTHER 
LESS-LETHAL WEAPONS 3 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/232215.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/C5BE-FPGW]. In the 1950s, a more potent compound, 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile 
(“CS”) hit the markets. Id. In the 1980s and 1990s, oleoresin capsicum (“OC”), a compound 
extracted from chili plants to make pepper spray, was marketed as an alternative to CN and CS. Id. 
 289. See TECH. ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., OLEORESIN 
CAPSICUM: PEPPER SPRAY AS A FORCE ALTERNATIVE 2 (1994). 
 290. Similar to how the strength of coffee varies by grind, the finer pepper is ground before 
oil is extracted to make pepper spray, the stronger the spray will be. Id. 
 291. The less viscous the OC solution, the easier it will be to spray as a mist and the greater 
the weapon’s effective range. Id. 
 292. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.224d(ii) (2018); WIS. ADMIN. CODE JUS § 14.05 (2001). 
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of over 20 feet.293 Most jurisdictions take a less precise approach such as 
limiting cannister size.294 It is not hard to imagine states opting for the 
Michigan/Wisconsin approach in the future, however, or regulating one of 
the other indicators of potency.295 Historical weapons law precedent will be 
unhelpful for dealing with the constitutionality of such regulations, but that 
eventuality is obscured by the gun-centricity of modern-day litigation. 
To be sure, even then-Judge Kavanaugh recognized, in the abstract, this 
issue. He wrote that “when legislatures seek to address new weapons that have 
not traditionally existed . . . , there obviously will not be a history or tradition 
of banning such weapons . . . . [I]n such cases, the proper interpretive 
approach is to reason by analogy from history and tradition.”296 But what is 
the historical analogy for the amperage in a taser or the chemical, let alone 
its concentration, viscosity, or range, in a chemical spray? Kavanaugh did not 
say, nor could he—modern weapons are similar to older ones only at such a 
high level of generality (as weapons, for example) as to be doctrinally 
unhelpful. Yet this reality is obscured because there simply are insufficient 
non-gun cases to reveal it.297 
No matter what role history plays in Second Amendment doctrine, 
meanwhile, the historical analysis has been skewed in a gun-centric way that 
tends to expand gun rights. In particular, courts have analogized to 
nineteenth-century state-court opinions addressing the right to keep and bear 
arms,298 but they have overlooked how the challenged historical restrictions 
regulated far more weapons than guns alone. Some 1800s opinions included 
sweeping language about the destruction or evisceration of the right akin to 
 
 293. WIS. ADMIN. CODE JUS § 14.06 (2001). 
 294. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-401.6(a)(7) (West 2011) (permitting the use and 
possession of “tear gas” and functional equivalents so long as the “device or container does not 
exceed 150 cubic centimeters[,] . . . [the] cartridge or shell does not exceed 50 cubic 
centimeters, and . . . [the] gas device or container does not have the capability of discharging any 
cartridge, shell, or container larger than 50 cubic centimeters”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20(14)(a) 
(McKinney 2020) (excluding from certain regulations a “pocket-sized” “self-defense spray device”). 
 295. See supra notes 288–91 and accompanying text. 
 296. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  
 297. This critique is not unique to the Second Amendment even if it is especially pronounced 
in that context because the essence of the right to keep and bear arms revolves around a type of 
evolving technology—weaponry. In a Fourth Amendment case, for example, Justice Alito 
commented that “it is almost impossible to think of late–18th-century situations that are 
analogous to” GPS searches. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 420 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring). In a different case, the Court pondered whether “an e-mail [is] equivalent to a 
letter” or “a voicemail [is] equivalent to a phone message slip,” concluding that such comparisons 
are unhelpful to provide notice to police officers or guidance to courts tasked with enforcing the 
Fourth Amendment protections. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). See generally Han, 
supra note 51, at 75 (exploring how technology can “introduc[e] novel scenarios that reach 
beyond the paradigmatic circumstances upon which the existing scope of the right has been 
established”). 
 298. See supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text. 
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the language quoted above from modern opinions.299 But the context was 
different then because the courts were expressly considering regulations that 
swept more broadly than the gun policies at issue in many modern Second 
Amendment cases.300 As I argue above,301 restricting a panoply of personal 
weapons intuitively imposes a greater burden on the right to keep and bear 
arms than restricting just one weapon. Yet that nuance is overlooked in the 
gun-centric analysis. 
Heller arguably demonstrates this pathology. The Court cited State v. Reid, 
an Alabama Supreme Court opinion from 1840, as an example of how a 
regulation can amount to “a destruction of the right” to bear arms.302 Heller 
failed to mention, however, that the Alabama law in Reid restricted the carrying 
of “any . . . deadly weapon.”303 Heller characterized several other 1800s 
opinions in ways that also could suggest that they were solely gun laws. The 
majority wrote that “[i]n Nunn v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court struck 
down a prohibition on carrying pistols openly (even though it upheld a 
prohibition on carrying concealed weapons).”304 The Georgia statute 
considered in Nunn, however, did not prohibit “carrying pistols” alone, but 
expressly targeted various “Deadly Weapons.”305 
 
 299. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616 (1840) (discussing how a regulation can “amount[] 
to a destruction of the right” to bear arms); supra notes 245–48 and accompanying text. 
 300. To be sure, there were some historical laws that targeted firearms alone. For example, 
it would not make sense to include knives or impact weapons in a law addressing unlawfully 
“firing” weapons, a target of regulation dating back to at least the 1700s. See, e.g., 1792 Md. Laws 
22 (“That if any person or persons shall fire any gun or pistol in the said town, such person or 
persons shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay the sum of five shillings current money.”). 
The same was true of early safe storage laws, which focused on the risks presented by highly 
flammable gun powder. See, e.g., 1786 N.H. Laws 383–84, An Act to Prevent the Keeping of Large 
Quantities of Gun-Powder in Private Houses in Portsmouth, and for Appointing a Keeper of the 
Magazine Belonging to Said Town. Laws regulating the sale of firearms to Native Americans, too, 
frequently limited the scope of the restriction to firearms due to a concern about empowering 
enemies in battle. See, e.g., J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL, THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF 
CONNECTICUT: PRIOR TO THE UNION WITH NEW HAVEN COLONY 79 (1665) (“It is Ordered, that 
noe man within this Jurisdiction . . . shall sell or give to any Indean, directly or indirectly, any 
such gun or gunpowder, or shott, or lead, or mould, or military weapons, or armor . . . .”). 
 301. See supra notes 230–34 and accompanying text. 
 302. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (quoting Reid, 1 Ala. at 616–17). 
 303. See 1839 Ala. Acts 67, An Act to Suppress the Evil Practice of Carrying Weapons Secretly 
(regulating “any species of fire arms, or any bowie knife, Arkansaw tooth-pick, or any other knife 
of the like kind, dirk, or any other deadly weapon”). 
 304. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (citing Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846)). There are many 
reasons to be wary of Nunn that go beyond the scope of this Article. See Eric M. Ruben & Saul 
Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 
YALE L.J.F. 121, 123 (2015) (noting “Nunn and similar cases were the product of a unique 
regional culture during a unique period in the nation’s development”). 
 305. 1837 Ga. Laws 90, An Act to Guard and Protect the Citizens of this State, Against the 
Unwarrantable and too Prevalent use of Deadly Weapons (restricting the sale, possession, and 
carrying “of the hereinafter described weapons, to wit: Bowie, or any other kinds of knives, 
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Heller likewise relied on a Tennessee Supreme Court case, Andrews v. 
State, which struck down a statute Heller characterized as forbidding “openly 
carrying a pistol ‘publicly or privately, without regard to time or place, or 
circumstances.’”306 But as with the law in Nunn, the Tennessee statute at issue 
in Andrews was not limited to handguns, but also extended to other weapons, 
too.307 Indeed, the 1800s restrictions that get the most attention in modern 
Second Amendment case law generally applied to a broad array of weapons, but 
are treated in modern opinions as if they are analogous to today’s gun laws.308  
Legislators singled out firearms for separate regulatory treatment around 
the turn of the twentieth century because of the public threat posed by 
increasingly dangerous firearm technology.309 At that time, judges appreciated 
the fact that only one arm out of many was at issue. For example, in 1911, 
New York passed the Sullivan Law, which required permitting for the 
possession of pistols.310 When the law was challenged as violating the Second 
Amendment, the appellate court emphasized the focus on “one particular 
kind of arm.”311 The effect of the law was that “the citizen may not have that 
particular kind of weapon without a permit, as it had already said that he 
might not carry it on his person without a permit.”312 The law at issue in Bruen, 
now before the Supreme Court, is the lineal descendent of those century-old 
New York policies, and still today addresses just one of many arms: the handgun.313 
 
manufactured and sold for the purpose of wearing, or carrying the same as arms of offence or 
defense, pistols, dirks, sword canes, spears, &c”). 
 306. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (quoting Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 187 (1871)). 
 307. 1869-1870 Tenn. Pub. Acts 13, An Act to Preserve the Peace and Prevent Homicide, 
(prohibiting possession of “a dirk, swordcane, Spanish stiletto, belt or pocket pistol or revolver”). 
 308. For example, jurisdictions barred concealed carry of “arms of any kind whatsoever” or 
any “other deadly weapon.” See, e.g., DUVAL, supra note 35, at 423 (“[I]t shall not be lawful for 
any person in this Territory to carry arms of any kind whatsoever secretly, on or about their 
persons . . . .”); 1862 Colo. Sess. Laws 56, An Act To Prevent The Carrying Of Concealed Deadly 
Weapons In The Cities And Towns Of This Territory (“If any person or persons shall . . . carry 
concealed upon his or her person any pistol, bowie knife, dagger, or other deadly weapon, [they 
shall be fined].”). 
 309. See PATRICK J. CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF GUN RIGHTS FROM COLONIAL 
MILITIAS TO CONCEALED CARRY 311 (2019) (“The general public’s broad support for firearms 
regulations in the early twentieth century can be partly attributed to the United States leading 
the western civilized world in crimes and homicides committed . . . . To many contemporaneous 
observers, the root of the problem was indiscriminate pistol toting.”). As a New York State 
Coroner’s Office Report noted, “[t]he increase of homicide by shooting . . . indicates the urgent 
necessity of the proper authorities taking some measures for the regulation of the indiscriminate 
sale and carrying of firearms.” Revolver Killings Fast Increasing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 1911), at 4 
(quoting N.Y. State Coroner’s Office Report). 
 310. See 1911 N.Y. PENAL LAW 195.10 (codifying N.Y. Penal Law § 1897, ¶ 3). 
 311. People ex rel. Darling v. Warden of City Prison, 154 A. D. 413, 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913). 
 312. Id. In rejecting the challenge to the Sullivan Law, the court also relied on the basis, 
rejected in McDonald, that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states. Id. at 419. That 
aspect of the opinion is less relevant to exploring today’s gun-centric litigation. 
 313. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Corlett, No. 20-843, 2021 WL 1602643, at *1 (U.S. 
Apr. 26, 2021) (granting certiorari on the question “[w]hether the State’s denial of petitioners’ 
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The distinction between gun laws and broader weapons laws went 
overlooked in Heller’s historical analysis and has been overlooked by lower 
courts. The result is that modern-day opinions rely on inapt historical 
analogies to strike down gun-specific laws. Indeed, each of the modern-day 
opinions discussed above that found that gun laws destroyed or eviscerated 
the Second Amendment cited 1800s precedent for support without 
acknowledging this important distinction.314 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS 
This Article has described how Second Amendment litigation focuses 
almost exclusively on gun rights, despite the fact that guns are just one arm 
that most Americans choose not to have or carry for self-defense. I have 
argued that judges overlook the breadth of weapons and weapons policies 
implicated by the Second Amendment. As a result, the Second Amendment 
analysis in some opinions has been distorted in concrete ways. This Part 
considers broader implications and potential solutions. 
It is worth repeating at the outset of this discussion that some degree of 
distortion can always be expected in the judicial process. Discrete cases will 
never be perfectly representative of the broader range of questions implicated 
in a legal area. And, judges, like all humans, have cognitive biases that might 
be especially pronounced when faced with a discrete set of adjudicatory 
facts.315 These realities inform a broad critique of judicial competency,316 but 
my goal in this Part is to stay within the institutional boundaries as they 
currently exist; how can litigants and courts working within our current 
judicial framework reduce the likeliness of distortion due to unrepresentative 
litigation? I cannot propose a panacea, but I discuss some potential, partial 
solutions that pertain to advocates as well as judges. 
A. BRINGING ATTENTION TO THE BROADER FIELD 
When litigation asymmetries exist with respect to a right, one corrective 
is to balance out the litigation to remove the asymmetry, and thereby 
illuminate a more complete picture of the right. In that vein, some scholars 
have emphasized “the importance of deciding enough cases in order to clarify 
the scope of constitutional rights.”317 The hope is that if the raw number of 
cases is sufficient, the judiciary will operate like a laboratory, with judges 
considering a comprehensive spectrum of cases for any given issue and 
 
applications for concealed-carry licenses for self-defense violated the Second Amendment”); 
supra notes 242–43 (discussing New York’s concealed carry permitting law). 
 314. See supra notes 244–48. 
 315. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 894–95. 
 316. Id. at 916–17. 
 317. Leong, Making Rights, supra note 3, at 418 (critiquing this view); id. at 410–14 
(summarizing commentary). 
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developing doctrinal approaches to accommodate the range of cases.318 By 
the time an issue lands on the Supreme Court’s docket, the Justices can survey 
lower court case law, settle disagreements, and establish uniform standards. 
Second Amendment litigation demonstrates, however, that even with 
ample litigation such an efficient laboratory-like process is not preordained. 
The unrepresentativeness explored in this Article—gun-centricity—will not 
just disappear with a net increase in Second Amendment cases. Indeed, the 
Second Amendment defies assumptions about how one might expect 
litigation to proceed. Gun cases outpace nonlethal weapons cases 50 to 1 
despite evidence that challenges to restrictions on nonlethal weapons enjoy a 
higher success rate.319 After those losses, meanwhile, litigants in gun cases 
appeal at rates that surpass appeal rates in other types of civil litigation.320 In 
short, parties in gun cases are often undeterred by low chances of success, and 
those who exercise Second Amendment rights with other instruments rarely 
litigate.321 Whether the bias toward gun cases is due to well-financed, litigious 
advocacy organizations, regulatory asymmetry (with guns being regulated 
 
 318. See generally Maureen N. Armour, Federal Courts as Constitutional Laboratories: The Rat’s 
Point of View, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 135 (2008) (considering the role of the lower federal courts in 
the creation and implementation of Supreme Court doctrine); Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court 
Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 441 n.215 (2007) (“Scholars have debated whether or not it is 
beneficial to allow legal issues to ‘percolate’ in the lower courts, thereby producing a divergence 
of approaches which may then inform the Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution of an issue.”). 
 319. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 13, at 1482 (“Litigants . . . fared better when they 
challenged regulations on nonlethal weapons (25 percent success) than other types of weapons.”). 
 320. Ted Eisenberg has found that, in general, 19 percent of nontried civil cases resulting in 
a definitive judgment are appealed. Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and 
Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
659, 664 (2004). In contrast, Joseph Blocher and I found that at least 28 percent of civil Second 
Amendment cases in federal courts are appealed. Ruben & Blocher, supra note 13, at 1472–73. 
 321. This pattern defies the usual assumptions about litigation behavior. George Priest and 
Benjamin Klein famously hypothesized that litigants “form rational estimates” of the likelihood 
of a particular outcome and litigate, as opposed to settle, cases when they are most likely to 
prevail. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1, 4–6 (1984). This theory has proved accurate in many contexts. See generally Yoon-Ho Alex Lee 
& Daniel Klerman, The Priest-Klein Hypothesis: Proofs and Generality, 48 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 59 
(2016) (offering mathematical proofs of some of the hypotheses derived from Priest and Klein’s 
work). But the Priest-Klein hypothesis does not necessarily extend to the issues and arguments 
that litigants raise in any given case. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Why Priest-Klein Cannot Apply to 
Individual Issues in Patent Cases 3 (U. Iowa Legal Stud., Rsch. Paper No. 12-15, 2012), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132810 [https://perma.cc/ED8T-NL9G]. It also 
may not apply equally well across categories of litigation, such as ideologically driven gun 
litigation. This phenomenon in Second Amendment litigation has caught the attention of 
commentators who offer various explanations. Adam Samaha and Roy Germano, for example, 
have suggested that the surprising litigation rates in gun cases may reflect the stakes of gun rights 
for advocates and resources available to the litigation arm of the gun rights movement. Adam M. 
Samaha & Roy Germano, Are Commercial Speech Cases Ideological? An Empirical Inquiry, 25 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 827, 861 n.176 (2017). 
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more strictly than non-guns), or something else, we can expect a similar 
litigation imbalance to persist.322  
More litigation alone is thus unlikely to correct the problem. But is it 
possible to incentivize more non-gun cases seeking to vindicate taser rights, 
pepper spray rights, and so on? If possible, then the asymmetry between gun 
cases and non-gun cases would be reduced, the scope of the right to keep and 
bear arms would be reflected in litigation, and we could expect the judicial 
analysis to improve. 
This sort of solution has been proposed in other contexts. Zick, for 
example, proposes such a strategy for “reclaim[ing] the Free Exercise Clause”: 
“developing cases and arguments centering on the principle of religious 
discrimination—instead of, or in certain contexts in addition to, expressive 
discrimination.”323 In that way, litigants can “force courts to re-engage with 
[the Free Exercise Clause] as an independent guarantee.”324 Leong, likewise, 
proposes litigating rights “in multiple contexts simultaneously,” which among 
other things increases the likeliness that “the people and factual 
circumstances presented are . . . roughly representative of the people and 
factual circumstances to which the resulting legal principles will be applied.”325 
But how do we motivate such litigation? If non-gun cases have not been 
prominent in the 13 years since Heller, there is little reason to expect them to 
suddenly arise in the future, especially absent a broader shift in the public’s 
appetite for bringing non-gun cases. The interrelationship between public 
sentiment and constitutional lawmaking is widely acknowledged. Zick 
observes that the undeveloped jurisprudence of the First Amendment’s Press 
Clause, for example, “track[s] the public’s apparent sense of the value of a 
free press.”326 David Cole has credited the concerted effort by gun advocates 
to change public perceptions about the Second Amendment with bringing 
about Heller.327 Litigation, in this view, is secondary to public sentiment.328 
 
 322. And unlike an actual laboratory, the case-or-controversy requirement discussed above, 
supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text, means that judges cannot balance out 
unrepresentative litigation to achieve a representative picture. Cf. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
EVALUATION AND REPORTING OF AGE-, RACE-, AND ETHNICITY-SPECIFIC DATA IN MEDICAL DEVICE 
CLINICAL STUDIES 5 (2017) (“[I]t is important that clinical trials include diverse populations that reflect 
the intended use population.”); Lauran Neergaard & Federica Narancio, Push Is Underway to Test 
COVID-19 Vaccines in Diverse Groups, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 18, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ 
health-us-news-ap-top-news-virus-outbreak-clinical-trials-b31d556907b671cdc15ab6024aaa6d87 
[https://perma.cc/NJ2V-5LQZ] (“Scientists say a diverse group of test subjects is vital to 
determining whether a vaccine is safe and effective for everyone and instilling broad public 
confidence in the shots once they become available.”). 
 323. ZICK, supra note 3, at 129. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Leong, Improving Rights, supra note 3, at 410. 
 326. ZICK, supra note 3, at 96. 
 327. COLE, supra note 16, at 95–148. 
 328. Id. 
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Advocates for weapons regulation thus might find benefit in educating 
the public about the many non-gun instruments available for self-defense, as 
well as their protection by the Second Amendment, in order to shift popular 
conceptions of the right to keep and bear arms. If the public appreciated that 
Second Amendment rights are not just gun rights and understood how self-
defense looks in practice, that could eventually both motivate litigation and 
alter the picture judges see when they look past the case at hand to the public 
square.  
Or, perhaps, there is some legislative way to realign litigation incentives. 
Leong, for example, notes how providing for attorneys’ fees can motivate 
litigation where it otherwise is lacking.329 Yet such a solution would require 
legislative will to broaden the scope of weapons restrictions subject to 
litigation. When it comes to legislation implicating guns, however, the 
legislative process is arguably more pathological than the judicial process.330 
Moreover, even if it were possible to implement a broad public education 
campaign about the true expanse of arms or pass a law that would incentivize 
more non-gun cases, there is an urgency for more immediate corrective 
action. Precedent is being established that will constrain future decisions.331 
Stare decisis has myriad virtues,332 but it means that misguided doctrine is 
“sticky” and hard to revisit once set.333 And the Supreme Court, with its grant 
of certiorari in Bruen, has signaled that it is ready to start setting Second 
Amendment doctrine. Something else, besides non-gun cases, is needed. 
 
 329. Leong, Improving Rights, supra note 3, at 431–32. 
 330. See generally Jacob D. Charles, Securing Gun Rights By Statute: The Right to Keep and Bear 
Arms Outside the Constitution, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (discussing examples of gun 
control legislation faltering even when garnering widespread public support); see also ALEX 
TAUSANOVITCH, CHELSEA PARSONS & RUKMANI BHATIA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HOW PARTISAN 
GERRYMANDERING PREVENTS LEGISLATIVE ACTION ON GUN VIOLENCE (2019), https://www.american 
progress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2019/12/17/478718/partisan-gerrymandering-prevents-
legislative-action-gun-violence, [https://perma.cc/NN44-GHFC] (discussing how partisan 
gerrymandering creates a disconnect between the public’s desire for gun legislation and legislative 
action). 
 331. See Hathaway, supra note 51, at 606 (“The doctrine of stare decisis . . . creates an 
explicitly path-dependent process. Later decisions rely on, and are constrained by, earlier 
decisions.”). 
 332. See Han, supra note 51, at 106 (noting that stare decisis insulates the law from “the 
vicissitudes of public debate”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional 
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 73 (1991) (supporting “the traditional view 
that precedents should be overruled only when the prior decision was wrongly decided and there 
is some other important disadvantage in respecting that precedent”); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE 
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (noting the necessity for continuity over time with 
respect to precedent). 
 333. See Deborah M. Ahrens & Andrew M. Siegel, Of Dress and Redress: Student Dress Restrictions 
in Constitutional Law and Culture, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 92 (2019) (“[L]egal doctrine is 
often ‘sticky,’ refusing to budge for some time or in some places or to some degree even after 
popular sentiments and habits of thought have shifted.”); see also supra note 51 and accompanying 
text (noting resolution of legal issues too early can create misguided doctrines resistant to change). 
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That “something else,” I contend, must involve finding solutions in 
existing gun litigation. Gun rights advocates are unlikely to draw attention to 
non-gun weapons that might dilute the monopoly guns have in Second 
Amendment jurisprudence, but governments defending against Second 
Amendment challenges and amici can do so.334 Indeed, drawing attention to 
the overlooked scope of the policy landscape constitutionalized by Heller 
would be a textbook contribution in an amicus brief. Commentators have 
observed the trend of “amicus overload,”335 and perhaps this is true in Second 
Amendment cases.336 However, an overflow of amicus briefs does not 
minimize the importance of briefs that are “additive to the party discussion, 
and contribute to the Court’s knowledge base in some significant way.”337 The 
Supreme Court’s rules invite “brief[s] that bring[] to the attention of the 
Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties.”338 
Amicus briefs highlighting the scope of weapons covered by the Second 
Amendment, the sorts of questions that doctrine will need to address, and the 
relative burden on Second Amendment rights imposed by a given gun 
restriction, would do just that.339 
The proposal of bringing new arguments in litigation is admittedly 
modest, yet will likely face resistance and, of course, counterarguments. 
Parties currently advocating for gun restrictions may instinctively hesitate to 
suggest that the Second Amendment protects a broader range of weapons 
than guns. After all, gun-safety advocates failed to participate in Caetano and 
have lined up in defense of non-gun weapons restrictions in other cases.340  
The failure to put guns into a broader weapons perspective may be due 
to a fear that acknowledging an expanded range of protected weapons could 
lead to a net increase in individuals keeping and bearing them, which such 
advocates view as undesirable. Moreover, there is uncertainty about how 
 
 334. Leong, Improving Rights, supra note 3, at 432 (noting the importance of encouraging 
“robust amicus practice”). 
 335. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Adam Feldman, Separating Amicus Wheat from Chaff, 106 GEO. 
L.J. ONLINE 135, 135 (2017); Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective 
Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 33, 34 (2004) (noting an 800 percent increase in amicus 
brief filings from the decade beginning in 1946 to the decade beginning in 1986); Anthony J. 
Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Amicus Curiae at the Supreme Court: Last Term and the Decade in Review, 
LAW.COM (Nov. 18, 2020, 6:11 PM), https://www.law.com/supremecourtbrief/2020/11/18/ 
amicus-curiae-at-the-supreme-court-last-term-and-the-decade-in-review [https://perma.cc/X9HZ-ALH6] 
(“The 2019–20 term had more than 900 amicus briefs filed in argued cases, the highest average 
number of amicus briefs per case ever.”). 
 336. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (describing quantity of amicus briefs 
submitted in high-profile Second Amendment cases). 
 337. Lynch, supra note 335, at 69. 
 338. SUP. CT. R. 37.1. 
 339. See Diane L. McGimsey, Expert Q&A on Best Practices for Amicus Briefing, PRAC. L., 
Aug./Sept. 2016, at 18, 19 (noting that the best amicus briefs “[p]resent[] arguments or theories 
not advanced by the parties . . . includ[ing] offering alternative legal grounds for deciding the case”). 
 340. See, e.g., Teter v. Connors, Docket No. 20-15948 (9th Cir.) (listing parties). 
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judges would respond to a broader view of arms. In a world where chemical 
agents, tasers, knives, and other arms are covered by the Second Amendment, 
courts might use the broader understanding of arms not to moderate gun 
rights but to broaden other weapons rights in ways that could exacerbate 
public safety concerns. We might end up with a public carry regime, for 
example, that includes long-blade knives and baseball bats in addition to 
handguns. Negative externalities of expansive gun rights, including the 
suppression of speech and other freedoms,341 could be made worse. We might 
end up with more weapons deaths and injuries, not less. After all, non-gun 
weapons can be dangerous, too, as the January 6, 2021, insurrection at the 
U.S. Capitol made all too clear.342  
These fears are understandable, but they must be viewed in light of a 
sober assessment of the post-Heller Second Amendment. A logical implication 
of Heller, accepted by the courts,343 is that the Second Amendment protects 
weapons beyond guns. The question is not whether knives, tasers, chemical 
sprays, and blunt force weapons are protected under Heller, but how they are 
protected relative to other arms and especially guns. It is, of course, 
impossible to know how judges will respond to a more comprehensive 
understanding of arms and the Second Amendment regulatory context when 
deciding gun cases. But those who are seeking to realize a vision of the Second 
Amendment that would accommodate reasonable gun regulations must 
consider the very real possibility that, on its current trajectory, all weapons are 
protected but none more so than the most lethal ones, guns. Expanding the 
frame to include other weapons highlights gun-centric flaws in current 
doctrine that, this Article contends, facilitate the overturning of gun laws. 
Exposing those flawed arguments should be of interest to gun safety 
advocates.  
B. EXERCISING JUDICIAL MODESTY IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY 
This Article also speaks to the problem of judicial doctrine-making and 
implementation when unrepresentative litigation conceals the policies and 
questions implicated in a given legal area. While the Second Amendment case 
study does not lend itself to a grand theory of when such circumstances will 
exist, it does highlight two contextual factors signaling that litigation might 
be unrepresentative and that the risk of distortion is pronounced: cases 
involving nascent areas of law and heavy interest-group involvement. When 
those factors are present, the broader picture can be obscured even when 
 
 341. See Blocher & Siegel, supra note 39; Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests, 104 IOWA L. 
REV. 223, 252–53 (2018). 
 342. See, e.g., Joe Guillen & Jennifer Dixon, Michigan Man Arrested for Hitting Police with Hockey 
Stick During Capitol Breach, FBI Says, USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2021, 3:52 PM), https://www.usa 
today.com/story/news/nation/2021/01/21/wixom-hockey-stick-attack-capitol-breach/6661275002 
[https://perma.cc/35WK-KN6J] (detailing the arrest of a man who hit police with a hockey stick). 
 343. See supra Section III.A. 
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judges try to look past the case at hand to other precedent, scholarship, and 
public commentary. In such situations, an apparently unified front can 
conceal a more complex reality, and judges should accordingly proceed with 
both caution and flexibility. 
This recommendation parallels the common wisdom about judging 
during times of technological change. In the Fourth Amendment context, for 
example, Orin Kerr contends that “[w]hen technology is in flux, Fourth 
Amendment protections should remain relatively modest until the 
technology stabilizes.”344 David Han advocates generally for “flexible, open-
ended, and narrowly applied standards” when technology is rapidly 
advancing.345 In the absence of such methodological modesty, the law risks 
“doctrinal obsolescence,” with “the perpetuation of rules and principles that 
do not sensibly fit the world that we currently inhabit.”346 
Returning to the Second Amendment example, in the pre-Heller days, a 
flexible judicial approach prevailed in right-to-keep-and-bear-arms cases. 
Adam Winkler has written how state courts before Heller decided right-to-arms 
questions by inquiring whether a regulation was “reasonable,”347 a no-doubt 
loose inquiry, but one flexible enough to deal with judicial uncertainty. After 
Heller, most lower courts have adopted a different, but still flexible, approach 
for resolving Second Amendment cases. In particular, the consensus 
approach described above348 preserves room for new understandings of the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s protection. The application of broad, rigid 
rules, in contrast, like THT, can stunt the law from responding to such new 
understandings. 
This call for methodological restraint, however, is in tension with 
countervailing calls for the adoption of far-reaching judicial rules. 
Commentators have noted that the “[Supreme] Court increasingly seems to 
favor rules over standards.”349 A plurality of Justices seems to prefer rules 
based solely in history and tradition.350 In other words, inertia at the Court 
might be moving away from the solution I am proposing. Thus, I hasten to 
emphasize that my point is not that rules will never be appropriate, but rather 
that they are unwise until courts develop a thorough understanding of the 
scope of a legal area, which has not yet happened for the Second Amendment 
 
 344. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case 
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004). 
 345. See Han, supra note 51, at 114. 
 346. Id. at 130. 
 347. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 716 (2007) 
(“The states have applied a reasonable regulation test to a wide array of gun control measures . . . .”). 
 348. See supra notes 269–71 and accompanying text. 
 349. See Blocher, supra note 230, at 314. 
 350. See supra notes 32 & 279 and accompanying text (discussing methodological views of 
current Justices). 
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as a result of the gun-centricity of post-Heller litigation.351 To the extent the 
Justices are tempted to set bright-line rules in future Second Amendment 
cases, they should recall the Supreme Court’s caution in Heller that “one 
should not expect [the Court] to clarify the entire field” in the “Court’s first 
in-depth examination of the Second Amendment.”352 Given the gun-centricity 
of litigation during the past 13 years, it would still be premature to try to do 
so now.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Litigation is often viewed as reflecting a sort of natural logic that extends 
to the selection of cases for resolution and the common law process of 
developing and implementing coherent doctrine. Yet this laboratory process 
does not always self-execute without a glitch. Second Amendment 
jurisprudence demonstrates how unrepresentative litigation can lead to 
analytical distortions. By illustrating a more nuanced picture of that 
phenomenon for a consequential area of law, I hope to advance our 





 351. Cf. Han, supra note 51, at 130–31 (making a similar point with regard to technological change). 
 352. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
